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RICHARD H. MCADAMS*

An Attitudinal Theory of
Expressive Law

L

aw is often defined by the fact of its sanction. The state
does not merely recommend compliance with the rules we
call law, but backs those rules with liability or punishment.' Law
and economics in particular treats state-created sanctions as central to the study of law. Sanctions so dominate economic thinking that most analysis treats as synonymous the questions: "What
is the effect of the legal rule?" and "What is the effect of the
legal sanctions that enforce the rule?" A strict focus on sanctions, however, obscures how law can otherwise influence behavior. Legal theorists sometimes posit that law affects behavior
"expressively" by what it says rather than by what it does.2 In
recent years, various economic theorists, particularly those concerned with norms, have pursued this line, suggesting that law
has an expressive influence on behavior independent of the effect created by its sanctions.' The new literature attempts to
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I thank Dov Cohen,
Dhammika Dharmapala, Rick Hasen, Anna Marshall, and Tom Ulen for comments
on an earlier draft.
1 See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (Richard Campbell ed.,
5th ed. 1885).
2 Following Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1599,
1624-25 (1998), we should sharply distinguish the consequentialist claim to which I
refer-that legal expression causes behavioral change-from the non-consequentialist claim that law has a moral value based on what it expresses. Theorists pursuing
the latter idea evaluate law according to the moral quality of what it says independent of what the expression causes (or probably even whether it satisfies individual
preferences for government expression). Some of these theorists see expressive values as a means of critiquing a utilitarian or economic evaluation of law. For an
interesting exchange, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Lingustic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Expression" and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply
Response to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
3 See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L.

[3391
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 339 2000

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79, 20001

remedy the vagueness of the old thesis by explaining exactly how
the expressive function operates. In that vein, this Article
presents one causal theory for the expressive effect of law, specifically, that law changes behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of a community or society. Because people are motivated
to gain approval and avoid disapproval, the information signaled
by legislation and other law affects their behavior.
The attitudinal theory has three components. First, there is a
motivational assumption that an individual's behavior depends,
in part, on what actions she believes others will approve or disapprove. The motivating power of approval may arise either because the individual values approval for its own sake, or as an
instrument for achieving some other end. Second, there is a
claim that individuals have imperfect information about what
others approve and that their beliefs about such matters are frequently (though not inevitably) mistaken. Given their concern
for approval, individuals are therefore sensitive to new sources of
information. Third, there is a claim that democratically produced
legislative outcomes are positively correlated with popular attitudes and therefore provide a signal of those attitudes. Independent of the sanction, the legislative signal influences behavior by
causing people to update their prior beliefs about what others
approve and disapprove. The attitudinal theory is certainly not
the only way to explain the expressive effect, and there are almost certainly some effects it cannot explain.4 But it does proREV. 1649 (forthcoming 2000); Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Constitutions
(2000) (unpublished draft, on file with the author); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law
and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998). The recent resurgence of interest in
this topic is not limited to economic theorists. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHi. L. REV. 591 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When
Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1039 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997);

Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996); Janice Nadler, The Effects of Perceived Injustice on Deference to the Law
(2000) (unpublished draft, on file with the author).
4 Indeed, I have written elsewhere of another explanation of the expressive effect,
one I term the "focal point" theory. See McAdams, supra note 3. And I am pursuing a third explanation in Dhammika Dharmapala and Richard H. McAdams, The
Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law (2000) (unpublished draft, on file with the author). Probably some combination of explanations will be necessary to account fully for the law's expressive
effect.
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vide one simple and plausible story that can be empirically tested
and measured against competing theories.
The attitudinal theory of expressive law also presents several
interesting implications. First, the theory implies that local ordinances will have a greater expressive effect than state or national
legislation because most approval and disapproval occur locally,
where others observe us. Second, the perception that "special
interests" control the legislature will undermine the expressive
effect because it depends on the size of the perceived positive
correlation between public attitudes and legislation. Third, court
decisions may also have an expressive effect because court decisions often reflect public attitudes. The most significant implication, however, is some insight into political conflict over symbols.
Economic analysis has trouble explaining why people invest resources into legislative (or other) disputes in which the winner
will gain no material wealth. But the conflict becomes less puzzling when one realizes how even purely symbolic government
action can, by signaling attitudes, change behavior. If law has an
expressive effect on behavior, then expressive law offers interest
groups another tool for achieving their ends. We may then analogize to the public choice observation that interest groups struggle to capture the legislature's power to redistribute material
wealth: the attitudinal theory explains symbolic political struggle
as the effort of interest groups to capture the state's expressive
power.
Part I presents and explains the attitudinal theory of expressive law. Part II extends the model and explores its implications,
particularly for explaining symbolic political conflict.5
I
AN ATTITUDINAL THEORY OF THE EXPRESSIVE
POWER OF LAW

Economics explains an individual's behavior as the result of his
preferences, beliefs, and opportunities. That is, an individual
seeks to maximize satisfaction of his preferences, given his beliefs
about how he can accomplish these ends, subject to the constraints of his opportunities. In recent years, various rational
5 A third subject, discussed below, though only as an aside to the main discussion
is how the points discussed bear on theories about the origin of norms and, in particular, the esteem theory I advanced in Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
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choice theorists have applied this basic framework to explain social regularities, such as norms, that were at one time thought to
be outside the range of economic theory.6 In a prior article, I
offered an "esteem" theory of social and group norms.7 I posited
that individuals have a preference for esteem; they care what
others, even strangers, think of them as an end in itself. Individuals therefore experience disapproval as a cost and approval as a
benefit. As a result, the belief that others generally disapprove a
behavior makes that behavior more costly, at least if there is
some risk that others will detect the behavior. Conversely, the
belief that others generally approve a behavior makes the behavior less costly (or more beneficial). As is standard, I assume that
the intensity of this preference varies continuously among
individuals.
One implication of the esteem theory is that one can change an
individual's behavior merely by changing her beliefs about what
others approve or disapprove. In this Part, I contend that legislation is one way to change such beliefs, that is, that legislation can
influence behavior merely by causing individuals to update their
beliefs about the approval patterns8 in their community or society. But I also demonstrate that this attitudinal theory of expressive law, while implied by the esteem theory,9 does not depend
on it. If people value approval even for instrumental reasons,
then law affects behavior by changing beliefs about how to gen6 For cites outside of the legal literature, see id. at 339-40 n.2. Within law and
economics, most of the work follows the lead of ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHoUT LAW (1991). Some of this scholarship seeks to explain the origin of
norms. Robert Cooter, for example, focuses on internalization, a process of preference change by which the individual comes to prefer the behavior the norm requires
and feels guilt acting otherwise. See Cooter, supra note 3; Robert Cooter, Models of
Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the "Bad
Man" of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903 (1998) (explaining differences in behavior by
differences in preferences often risks circularity). But Cooter seeks to avoid the
problem by using observable opportunities to explain and predict preference
change. See Richard H. McAdams, Modeling Morality: What are the Limits to SelfDirected Preference Change?, 78 B.U. L. REv. 947, 948-51 (1998) (discussing
Cooter's concept of a "Pareto self-improvement"). Eric Posner, on the other hand,
posits only that individuals have continuously varying discount rates-preferences
for the future. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). Posner further shows that individuals may engage in customary behaviors to signal low discount rates (or to avoid signaling high discount rates) and thereby attract (or avoid
repelling) partners for cooperative enterprises. Id.
7 See McAdams, supra note 5.
8 1 use "approval pattern" to refer to both approval and disapproval patterns.

9 See McAdams, supra note 5, at 400-07.
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erate approval. As long as legislation is positively correlated
with popular attitudes or opinions, then it will cause individuals
to revise their beliefs about the expected approval or disapproval
and to act accordingly. For example, when a town council enacts
an ordinance requiring citizens to leash their dogs, recycle newspaper, or transport children in safety seats, the ordinance causes
people to expect greater disapproval from acting otherwise. In
each case, the desire to avoid disapproval provides an additional
incentive to obey the law.
Part I separately explores the three components of the attitudinal theory of the expressive power of law. Section A explains
why an individual's behavior depends, in part, on what kinds of
behavior she believes others approve or disapprove. Section B
explains how individuals often (though not inevitably) make mistakes about what others approve. Section C then demonstrates
how law supplies some of the desired information. In presenting
this argument, I am not claiming that law necessarily supplies the
correct information, or that law inevitably supplies information
not previously available, or that the effect of law is always significant. Instead, I present the more modest claim that legislation,
or at least certain categories of legislation, cause people to update their prior beliefs about what others in their society or community approve. In some instances, the behavioral consequences
are significant.
A.

The Motivating Power of Approval and Disapproval

There are at least two reasons why approval motivates behavior. An individual may value approval intrinsically because it
satisfies a preference for esteem or instrumentally because it
helps to achieve other ends.
If an individual has a preference for esteem, her utility directly
depends on what she perceives others to think of her. She gains
utility when she believes others do not esteem her and loses utility when she believes others disesteem her. Although the individual cares more about the esteem of her social groups and
people who know her well, she places some value even on the
esteem of strangers. Many social theorists have posited such a
preference1" and it well explains a large body of social science
10 See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 62 (D. D. Raphael &
A. L. Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1759) ("To deserve, to acquire, and to
enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind, are the great objects of ambition and
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 343 2000
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research, much of which I have reviewed elsewhere.11 Here, I
will mention just one additional example of such evidence, an
experiment from the new literature on "behavioral" law and

economics.
Behavioral theorists and some critics of economics have focused great attention on "ultimatum" and "dictator" games. 12 In
these games, an individual has to decide how to divide a sum of
money between herself and another player.13 The fact that many
individuals share substantial amounts of the money, often half,
suggests that individuals are highly motivated by altruism or a
commitment to normative principles of fairness. 14
However, a recent experiment reveals that the subjects might
emulation."); JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 130 (1990)
(although it can bring various benefits, "[social] status, or recognition from others,
has long been regarded by psychologists as a primary source of satisfaction to the
self."); Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725,
740 (1990) ("[E]ven in the absence of praise or censure the attitude of approval is a
good that I can savor and the attitude of disapproval a bad under which I may
smart[.]"); ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE 129-51 (1961)
(chapter on "Approbativeness as the Universal, Distinctive, and Dominant Passion
of Man"; approbativeness is "the desire for approval or admiration of oneself, one's
acts, and one's achievements on the part of one's fellows, and for the expression by
them of this feeling").
11 The evidence shows that the mere observation of subjects affects their behavior,
even in circumstances where the likelihood of future interaction with the observer is
remote and the likelihood the observer could affect the subject's welfare in any future interaction is even more remote. See Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms,
Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2250 nn.40-41 (1996) (discussing
psychological experiments on conformity); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and
Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108
HARV. L. REv. 1003, 1009-19 (1995) (discussing unexpected cooperation in experimental one-shot prisoner's dilemmas and real world settings); see also Dan M.
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning,and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 352-56
(1997) (discussing psychological evidence for "social influence").
12 For reviews, see RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE 21-35 (1992);
Alvin E. Roth, BargainingExperiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253, 282-92, 296-302 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Colin
Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictatorsand Manners, 9 J.
ECON. PERSP. 209 (1995).
13 In the ultimatum game, Player 1 proposes some division with Player 2 of a sum
of money provided by the experimenter. Player 2 then chooses either (1) to accept
the proposed division, in which case both players receive what Player 1 proposed, or
(2) to reject the proposed division, in which case both players receive nothing. In the
dictator game, Player 1 simply chooses a division of the money and the experimenter
then allocates the money according to this division.
14 See, e.g., THALER, supra note 12; Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489-97 (1998) (using these studies
to argue that "[a] concern for fairness is part of most agents' utility function."); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
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actually have been motivated by their selfish concerns for the esteem of the researchers. 5 In prior experiments, subjects knew
they remained anonymous from other subjects. In the more recent experiment, researchers also made sure each individual sub-

ject's decision was unknown to the researchers.

When the

experiment was double-blind, the amount people allocated to the
other player fell significantly. 6 Apparently, the mere knowledge
that researchers were watching, combined with beliefs about
what behavior they will approve or disapprove, caused material
changes in behavior. The results of the double-blind experiment
suggest that much, though not all, of the apparently unselfish be-

havior actually reflects a selfish concern for the esteem of
researchers.

17

Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (using these studies to argue for a "fairness norm").
15 See Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in
Bargaining Games, 7 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAV. 346 (1994).

16 The percentage of Player l's allocating nothing to Player 2's rose from 20% in
the original experiments to nearly two-thirds in the double-blind experiment. See
also Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distanceand Other-RegardingBehavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653, 659 (1996) (reporting a variety of experiments
manipulating the social distance between Player 1 and Player 2, finding similar results in the double-blind experiment, and concluding that "people act as if they are
other regarding because they are better off with the resulting reputation.").
17 Just as some theorists have used evolutionary game theory to argue that altruism can provide adaptive fitness for an organism, see Helmut Bester and Werner
Guth, Is Altruism Evolutionarily Stable?, 34 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 193 (1998);

Werner Giith, An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by
Reciprocal Incentives, 24 INr-'L J. GAME THEORY 323 (1995), others have made the

same argument for a preference for esteem. See Chaim Fershtman & Yoram Weiss,
Why Do We Care What Others Think About Us?, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND

ORGANIZATION 133 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998). These theorists imagine that a preference for status (what I call esteem) creates an indirect
benefit because two people who care about status may be able to cooperate when
two people who do not care about status could not. Specifically, if individuals gain
status according to their effort, then these rewards may convert what would otherwise be a prisoner's dilemma game (based on material payoffs) into a game where
defection is no longer the dominant strategy. Id. at 136-39. Under certain conditions, preferences for status are evolutionarily stable (particularly if people only care
about esteem from others motivated by esteem and migration is possible between
societies). Id. at 142-48.
One can also imagine an evolutionary argument for esteem like the one Robert
Frank makes for the adaptive fitness of some human emotions. See ROBERT H.
FRANK, PASSIONS WrrHIN REASON (1988). An example is anger: emotion drives

one to retaliate even when the costs exceed the benefits, which is immediately undesirable, but usefully deters future attacks. Frank analogizes emotions to physical
pangs of hunger or thirst: rationality alone might motivate an individual to retaliate
in order to develop a reputation for retaliating, but anger provides a more reliable
incentive. Similarly, for animals that survive best in groups, some "push" toward
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 345 2000

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79, 20001

A second explanation for why approval motivates behavior is
that people value approval instrumentally. Consider the follow-

ing familiar scenario: B wants to win some favor from A, e.g., to
get a job or job reference, to be invited to a party or into a club,
or to get some useful gossip about C. To get A's favor, B seeks
to gain A's approval and avoid A's disapproval.1 8
The interesting question is what motivates A to behave in this

manner. The easiest cases to explain are those where B seeks a
position that involves interacting with A in the future, such as
joining the same firm or club or going to the same party. Where
B wants to interact with A, B will want to convince A that the
interaction will be beneficial. That can mean a lot of different
things.19 As one example, if B smokes and A dislikes being exposed to cigarette smoke, then A is less likely to do anything that

increases the chance of future interaction. What is true of smoking might be true of any behavior or trait that offends A's sense
of smell, morality, or aesthetics. That is, it creates a cost for A to
interact with B and therefore lowers her willingness to provide B
the favor she seeks.2" More generally, it is often the case that
one person will disapprove of another whose behaviors, traits, or
opinions are very different from her own and that she will dislike
associating with people she disapproves. 2 1 For instrumental reaherding or social clustering is adaptive. In complex social animals, such a preference
might not only motivate the individual to live with others of its species but help her
to build coalitions and avoid "accidental" conflict, i.e., conflict that occurs because
one individual's behavior is mistakenly perceived as challenging another. A preference for esteem might more reliably produce clustering and avoid conflict than rationality alone.
18 See Pettit, supra note 10, at 746 ("That someone comes to think ill of me ...
gives me reason to believe that ... the person is thereby made more likely, if the
costs are right, to speak unfavorably of me to others ... or to ... prefer[ I another in
the exercise of some patronage.").
19 For example, B may want to convince A that B has a low discount rate because, in many situations requiring cooperation, people with low discount rates are
better partners. See generally POSNER, supra note 6.
20 Of course, economic pressures sometimes restrain the inclination to grant favors on the basis of one's personal preferences. A classic example is employment.
The employer gains by hiring the employee with the highest expected productivity
regardless of other matters. But in cases like this, there is often a principal/agent
problem. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Principaland Agent, in THE NEW PALORAVE: ALLOCATION, INFORMATION, AND MARKETS 241 (1989); Stephen A. Ross, The Eco-

nomic Theory of Agency: The Principal'sProblem, 63 AM. EcoN. REV. 134, 138
(1973). The employer's hiring agent A always retains some discretion to deviate
from the employer's goal of maximizing productivity. A uses that discretion, and B

expects A to use that discretion, to hire people A "likes."
21 See RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 346 2000
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sons, then, B tries to avoid exhibiting22 behaviors, traits, or opinions he suspects that A disapproves.
The instrumental interest in approval provides a different interpretation of the double-blind dictator game: the subjects acted
to preserve the approval of the researchers as a means to some
other end. I continue to view the study (and others of its kind) as

demonstrating a preference for esteem because the instrumental
value of the researcher's approval seems to be much smaller than
the monetary sacrifice being made.2 3 I may be wrong, but it
makes no difference to the attitudinal theory of expressive law.2 4
All that matters for the theory is that approval motivates behav-

ior, either intrinsically or instrumentally. But if approval is valued only instrumentally, then the experiment

interestingly

demonstrates how utterly pervasive and all-consuming the instrumental concern for approval is. Specifically, it reveals that individuals seek approval even in a one-shot laboratory experiment
with only socially distant researchers-total or near strangerslooking on.
The ubiquity of approval-seeking leads to a third interpreta(1995) ("If your presence, with your hostilities to our local tastes and ways of doing
things, is discomforting to me, I have an interest in excluding you."); id. at 90 ("[Fjor
norms of difference and exclusion, there may be no costs to some sanctioners. They
are not sanctioning per se; rather, they are merely acting in the interests of their
comfort in familiarity or whatever and excluding those who are unfamiliar.")
22 Harder to explain is the instrumental value of approval in contexts that do not
involve A's interaction with B. For example, it is commonly thought that Professor
A's willingness to give Student B a job recommendation depends not merely on A's
estimate of B's abilities and traits needed for the job, but also on A's approval or
disapproval of B's non-job related behavior, traits, and opinions. But why would A
behave this way? A full answer would be surprisingly complex. A short answer is
that individuals often prefer that success come to like-minded others, either because
they see it as confirmation of their views, allowing them to "bask in reflected glory,"
or they believe that others will see it as such.
23 For there to be an instrumental value to the researcher's approval, the subject
must believe that there is a chance of interacting with the researcher in the future in
such a circumstance that the researcher will act more favorably if she approved the
subject's experimental behavior. Unless the subject is or plans to be a student of the
researcher, which is usually not the case, there is little chance that the subjects will
interact again with the researcher. If they do interact again, the experimenter is not
likely to recall how one of hundreds of subjects behaved in the experiment. If the
researcher somehow does recall and does disapprove, the level of disapproval at
issue will not likely affect how the researcher will act toward the subject in other
interactions. Thus, it seems far-fetched that the instrumental value of the researcher's approval exceeds the amounts being sacrificed (five dollars) in the
experiments.
24 Nor is the instrumental account necessarily inconsistent with the esteem theory
of norms I presented in McAdams, supra note 5.
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 347 2000
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tion of such experiments, namely, that even where the cost of
preserving approval exceeds the instrumental benefit, individuals
are still acting instrumentally but with imperfect rationality. Assume that people are only boundedly rational and save on information and decision costs by following various heuristics or
"rules of thumb." Rather than calculating on each occasion the
expected benefits of acting to preserve or gain a favorable opinion from others, one might just treat approval as always having
some minimum value, even though that means occasionally sacrificing more than the expected approval gain is actually worth.
Consider the following mundane illustration of this rule-ofthumb. Suppose you are deciding whether to "cut" in a line or to
follow the custom of entering at the end. Everyone in the line
appears to be a stranger. It is quite difficult to identify the instrumental benefit of avoiding these apparent strangers' disapproval
by waiting in line. There is some small risk that an individual
who strongly disapproves of line-breaking will violently retaliate
against you, either out of moralistic anger or from a strategic effort to build a reputation (among others in line who know her)
for retaliating against defectors. Moreover, you may encounter
one of the apparent strangers in the future, and she may withhold
some benefit from you out of moralistic anger or in the belief
that line-breaking predicts other forms of defection.2 5 Both costs
are extraordinarily difficult to ascertain. Quite reasonably, you
may decide that it does not pay to calculate the costs of linebreaking in each case. Instead you adopt a rule-of-thumb: you
estimate an average disapproval cost and, depending on its magnitude, decide either never or always to wait in line (absent dire
circumstances). As a result, you appear to value the esteem of
strangers non-instrumentally because you wait in line in some instances even though the benefits of breaking exceed the expected
costs. 26 In choosing this, you are simply following your rule-of25 Line-breaking might signal that an individual does not highly value future interactions with others in the community because, for example, she has a high discount
rate, see POSNER, supra note 6, or plans to leave the community in the near future.
26 Note how this analysis supports the claim of adaptive fitness mentioned in
supra note 17. If an individual with bounded rationality constantly confronts situations in which approval has instrumental value, then an individual with a weak preference for esteem may make better decisions than one with no preference for
esteem. See Hoffman et al., supra note 16, at 659; Pettit, supra note 10, at 746 (noting instrumental reasons for pursuing esteem and concluding that the "intrinsic concern for what others think [may be] implanted in us for instrumental reasons . . . by
evolution or by training.").
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 348 2000
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thumb and avoiding the costs of calculating the costs and benefits
in every case. 27

Determining which interpretation is best is not necessary because all three suffice to support the attitudinal theory of expressive law. Whatever the reason, as long as approval motivates
behavior, law can change behavior by providing information
about approval patterns.
B.

Uncertainty About the Approval Pattern: Random Errors
and Pluralistic Ignorance

That people seek the approval of others is one way of explaining the regularities of behavior we call norms. A pattern of approval may generate a pattern of behavior. For example, the fact

that virtually everyone approves the act of voting in political
elections may help to explain voting.28 Similarly, that virtually
everyone disapproves the act of breaking in line may help to explain the regularity of standing in line. 29 However, nothing guar27 A person behaving in this manner may nonetheless change her rule-of-thumb.
If circumstances changed sufficiently, the benefits of line-breaking would almost always exceed the costs (as for example, when one observes almost no one waiting in
line). The individual would eventually figure this out and go back to calculating in
each case or adopting a rule-of-thumb of always cutting in line. Philip Pettit gives
this kind of explanation a particular power by suggesting how this might operate at
an unconscious, less-than-fully-rational level. Self-interest might only consciously
come into play when one's behavior turns out to strongly sacrifice one's self-interest
and sounds "alarm bells" that cause the individual to consider her strategy. See
Philip Pettit, The Virtual Reality of Homo Economicus, 78 THE MONIST 308, 324

(1995) ("while virtual self-regard may be of no use in explaining the emergence or
continuation of any pattern of behaviour, it can be of great utility in explaining a
third explanandum: the resilience of that pattern of behaviour under various shocks
and disturbances."). One who ignores approval, pursues approval without regard to
cost, or tries to calculate the costs and benefits in each case eventually finds herself
noticing and regretting the costliness of her decision. But an individual who initially
decided, perhaps with little reflection, to treat esteem as always having some limited
value, without calculating the actual benefit, will get along well enough and have no
cause to recalculate her strategy.
28 See Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (1996).

29 See McAdams, supra note 5. This approach allows norms to be explained in
terms of the preceding patterns of approval and disapproval. There remains the interesting and difficult question of how to explain the patterns. I have only been able
to say a little about this subject. See id. at 359-60. This limitation leads some to
object that there cannot be an approval pattern unless there is first a norm, so that
the norm cannot be derived from the pattern. See Jane Mansbridge, Starting with
Nothing: On the Impossibility of Grounding Norms Solely in Self-Interest, in EcoNOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 151 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman

eds., 1998). However, people can and do disapprove of things that they know are
approved of or tolerated by everyone else, so disapproval does not always follow a
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 349 2000
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antees that a pattern of approval will generate a norm because,
among other things, 30 nothing guarantees that people will discover the pattern of approval. Not only do people make mistakes about such matters, but, as I explain below, the concern for
approval itself impedes the effort to discover the grounds on
which others grant approval and disapproval. The uncertainty of
what others actually think creates a demand for information
about public attitudes, information that I argue in the next section is supplied by law. In this section, I explain the basis of the
uncertainty, that is, why people sometimes fail to discover the
actual pattern of approval in their group or society.
Although the point of this section is to show that people make
mistakes about approval patterns, we should begin with the more
extreme claim that purely rational actors would never determine
the approval pattern. This objection is implied by Jon Elster's
assertion that one cannot derive norms from patterns of approval
and disapproval. 3 In supporting his general thesis that norms
norm. Various forces could cause individuals to disapprove of a behavior before
there is any norm against it. New information about second-hand smoke, for example, could cause increasing numbers of people, acting selfishly and alone, to begin
disapproving of public smoking. Once they recognize this new approval pattern, the
norm emerges.
The objection may then be that no one will disapprove of anything unless there is
first a more basic norm defining rights and harms. The norm against public smoking,
for example, requires that people share a pre-existing norm defining a harm to
others. There are two points here. First, the problem that norms are embedded in
other norms infects any theory of norm origin. But the problem does not stop us
from deriving particular norms from prior approval patterns. It just means that the
prior approval pattern came about, in part, because of some norm other than the
one we are trying to explain. The esteem theory of norms may not therefore be
useful for deriving the foundational norms of western culture, but it is useful for
discussing more marginal and contested norms, which are the focus of my study
precisely because law can manipulate only these norms. Second, despite the "embeddedness" of norms, approval patterns are still of fundamental importance. In a
hypothetical "state of nature" in which there were no norms, there could still be
approval and disapproval. The selfish desire to avoid pain, for example, could cause
individuals to disapprove of those who randomly inflict physical pain. The problem
is not that individuals in "normless" state would, lacking a social concept of "harm,"
fail to disapprove anything. More likely, the problem is that they would disapprove
everything that impeded their self-interest. Foundational norms operate to restrain
disapproval to cases of socially recognized harm. That's why we don't have to teach
children to disapprove other children for taking away a play toy. Instead we have to
teach them not to blame others for exercising their "fair" claims to such toys.
30 The other thing required is that individuals must perceive some risk of detection. If they believe no one can possibly detect their behavior, then they need not
worry about whether others approve or disapprove it. See McAdams, supra note 5,
at 361-62.
31 See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 98 (1989).
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are not "outcome-oriented," Elster claims that no one would rationally incur the costs to enforce norms. 32 Even the most minimal enforcement-expression of disapproval-is "always costly"
because "[o]ne may alienate or provoke the target individual, at
some cost or risk to oneself."3 3 In other words, if approval matters, one who expressly disapproves another always risks counterdisapproval by his target. This appears to create a circularity

problem as no one would want to express disapproval, and therefore no one would learn of any social pattern of disapproval. As
a result, Elster contends that one cannot explain norms as arising
from rational individuals seeking to avoid the sanction of
disapproval.3 4

However, upon closer inspection, there is no circularity. I first
respond to Elster by showing that individuals will often learn of
approval and disapproval patterns despite the problem of
counter-disapproval. I then use Elster's insight to explain how

frequently individuals misjudge what others think about common
behaviors.
1.

How Selfish and Rational Individuals Detect Approval
Patterns

Elster is right that expressing disapproval risks counter-disapproval and that the costs of expression may deter communication
and produce a state of collective ignorance about what people
actually think. But his objection further asserts that collective
32 Id.
33

34

133.
[W]hen one moves upwards in the chain of actions, beginning with the original violation, the cost of receiving disapproval falls rapidly to zero. People
do not frown upon others when they fail to sanction people who fail to
sanction people who fail to sanction people who fail to sanction a norm
violation. Consequently, some sanctions must be performed for motives
other than the fear of being sanctioned. I argued in the preceding
paragraphs that sometimes there is an unmoved mover at the very beginning of the chain. Here I have argued that every chain must have one.
Id. at

Id.
35 Note that it will not suffice to answer Elster by saying that people will express
disapproval indirectly or subtly. Admittedly, one may attempt to express disapproval without risking retaliation by making cryptic remarks or furtive gestures (e.g.,
by rolling one's eyes). But in every case, either the disapproval is not conveyed, in
which case the target is not sanctioned and no norm arises, or the disapproval is
conveyed, in which case the target is sanctioned but may counter by disapproving
the sanctioner. Similarly, it will not work to say that disapprovers might only express approval of behavior they esteemed and not disapproval. (I mistakenly suggested otherwise in McAdams, supra note 5, at 363). It is true that those receiving
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ignorance of esteem judgments is not just a possible equilibrium
but, given rational action, the only possible equilibrium. So
stated, the proposition seems doubtful.
First, note how unstable such an equilibrium is. Suppose that,
although it is not generally known, a large majority of society
disapproves behavior X. Against the counter-disapproval an individual may suffer from expressing disapproval of one who engages in X, one must weigh the possible third-party approval
from expressing the view that most others share. Indeed, one
may gain particular approval from being the first to express a
judgment shared by many who had previously been afraid to express themselves. For example, those who voice the first criticism of what had previously been a universally applauded work
of art, piece of scholarship, or trend in fashion, risk rejection but
later gain special recognition as "opinion leaders" when others
turn out to agree. Thus, when an individual believes that most
others will approve her expression of disapproval, she is likely to
take the risk of being first. If she is proved right, then others will
discover the true approval pattern. Ignorance remains an equilibrium only if an insufficient number of individuals begin to suspect the actual approval pattern.
There are at least two ways that rational individuals will, correctly or incorrectly, begin to form beliefs about approval patterns before anyone expresses their evaluative judgments. The
first is introspection. An individual will examine his own esteemjudgments and ask whether his basis for those judgments is likely
to be shared by others. He may reason that the factors causing
him to disapprove the behavior will affect most others in a similar way. 36
Second, an individual may observe and interpret the behavior
approval will not retaliate. But if people never express disapproval, the failure to
express approval would be understood as disapproval, so that everyone would express approval of everything to avoid risking counter-disapproval. The strategy of
selectively expressing approval is just another attempt at subtlety: those actually
disapproved of either do not infer that any distinction is being made, in which case
they never perceive a loss of esteem, or they do recognize the distinction, in which
case they may retaliate against those who damn them by refusing to express
approval.
36 For example, an individual may expect that others will disapprove behavior
against their interests, just as she disapproves behavior against her interests. See
Pettit, supra note 10, at 740. If A disapproves neighbors who play loud music in the

middle of the night because it disrupts her sleep, then she may assume that her
neighbors will disapprove of her if she plays loud music in the middle of the night.
The same is true of behavior she approves. If A esteems those who pick up litter in
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of others as evidence of their esteem judgments. To see how this
works, imagine yourself as an individual who wishes to avoid the
sting of counter-disapproval. When you are uncertain of the pattern, not only do you refuse to express disapproval of anyone's
conduct, but you even go so far as to never express approval of
anyone's conduct, lest the absence of expressed approval be read
as disapproval. But this is still not far enough because we routinely reveal our esteem judgments in our behavior. When we
invite someone to a party, hire a person for a job, or give money
to an agent for a charity, our action reveals evaluative judgments
that imply less approval if not outright disapproval of those not
selected. For example, if A observes that none of her colleagues
volunteer to work or socialize with B, who happens to be the
only office worker who wears fur or dates across racial lines, then
A may infer that her colleagues disapprove of those behaviors.
Perhaps Elster would respond that selfish and rational individuals would seek to avoid counter-disapproval by behaving in a
way that conceals their esteem judgments. But this would overlook a crucial distinction between avoiding the expression of disapproval and avoiding actions that reveal disapproval. Avoiding
these actions is costly. People prefer to interact more with those
they esteem. Even absent material consequences, people often
prefer to trade with or employ those they think well of, prefer to
socialize with people they esteem, and, most obviously, prefer to
date or marry those they hold in high regard. The effort to conceal the basis on which one grants or withholds esteem, by treating individuals identically, without regard to one's evaluation of
their behavior, would be painful. There is no reason to think that
the risk of counter-disapproval will always exceed these concealment costs.3 7 Thus, even without their expression, individuals
the neighborhood because it serves her interest in clean surroundings, she may expect her neighbors to esteem her for the same behavior.
37 Because a person may suffer costs from interacting with someone she finds offensive, a norm can also arise even if people value approval only instrumentally.
The normal assumption is that a selfish and rational person would not bother to
incur the "costs" of sanctioning another for violating a norm. See McAdams, supra
note 5, at 362-63. But if A finds B's presence offensive, then A will incur a benefit,
not a cost, by avoiding B. If B desires to interact with A, then she will regard this
avoidance behavior as a sanction. As a result, B may abstain from the behavior or
seek to conceal the traits that A finds offensive. A norm could emerge if enough
people follow this strategy. Even with this different starting point, most of what I
say in McAdams, supra note 5, about "esteem" norms would apply to norms derived
from an instrumental concern for approval. See also Robert Sugden, Normative ExHeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 353 2000
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will sometimes reveal esteem judgments in their behavior, and

will do so despite the risk of counter-disapproval. Consequently,
esteem-seeking individuals may discover a pattern of disapproval
without any overt expressions of disapproval.38
As soon as individuals begin to form beliefs about approval
patterns via introspection or behavioral inferences, their new beliefs can change their behavior. Once individuals believe that a

consequence of their behavior is net approval (disapproval), they
will perceive an additional benefit (cost) to that behavior. Even
without expressed disapproval, the pattern of approval may generate a behavioral regularity. Somewhere along the way, how-

ever, an individual is likely to think it worthwhile to express
disapproval. The same reasoning process that leads her to
change her behavior will lead her to believe that third-parties will

approve her expression of disapproval, all the more so if she has
observed other people adjusting their behavior to what she believes is the approval pattern. As explained above, this belief

makes it likely that someone will express the common sense of
disapproval. Hence, collective ignorance is not a necessary equilibrium. When individuals in society generally approve or disapprove a behavior, rational individuals can discover the pattern
and even choose to express themselves consistent with it. The
recognized approval pattern can then produce a norm.39
2. How Rational Individuals Make Mistakes About Approval
Patterns
Nothing guarantees that individuals will correctly judge an appectations: The Simultaneous Evolution of Institutions and Norms, in

ECONOMICS,

VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 73 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998).

38 We should therefore reject another claim Elster makes, that rational individuals
will never discover the approval pattern because the expression of disapproval "requires energy and attention that might be used for other purposes." ELSTER, supra
note 31, at 133. This cost is real. But for the reasons just stated, people can discern
disapproval even if no one expresses it, using either introspection or the observation
of behavior. Individuals who care about approval will be motivated to expend the
"energy and attention" needed to learn the criteria others use for granting or withholding approval, so Ihere is no necessity that others expend energy and attention
expressing those criteria.
39
Note I did not say a norm would emerge. That depends on how significant is
the expected approval or disapproval compared to the cost of conforming to the
approval pattern (engaging in the approved behavior or refraining from the disapproved behavior). See McAdams, supra note 5. But if my argument is sufficient to
demonstrate that individuals can expect approval or disapproval prior to any expression of approval or disapproval, then the circularity objection necessarily fails.
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proval pattern. To the contrary, some level of mistake is expected. For instance, suppose we ask a roomful of people to
write down the percentage of people in the United States who
disapprove of handgun ownership. We would expect a range of

answers, most of which would over- or underestimate the correct
level. We would get a similar range of mostly inaccurate answers
if we asked people to name the percentage of people in their
local community who disapproved of public smoking or unleashed dogs or who approved of prayer in public schools or the
medicinal use of marijuana. These mistakes are not a sign that
people do not care about approval any more than mistakes about
the price of milk indicate that people do not care about milk
prices. The problem is that information is costly. An individual
typically infers the approval patterns of a community or nation
from the actions and statements of people she knows, a far from
random sample of individuals.4" While media coverage of public
opinion polls corrects some of these mistakes, it is not likely to
eliminate them.4 '
The resulting errors might be random. That is, the range of
answers may be normally distributed around a mean that equals
the "true" value of the approval pattern. The general explanation for such an outcome is that for every person who gathers
40

The problem is compounded when we try to account for intensity of preferences. An individual cares whether those who disapprove of a certain behavior will
strenuously or tepidly object to the behavior. Given that intensity of disapproval (or
approval) can vary infinitely, determining the average degree of disapproval in a
group of individuals requires even more information.
41 If a poll indicates that 58% of parents "agree" that "responsible parenting requires the use of child safety seats for all young children on every automobile trip,"
then conceivably everyone might read the poll and hold the identical belief about
the approval pattern. But there are many reasons that polls won't prevent all mistakes about approval patterns. First, there isn't always a timely and scientifically
valid poll for every relevant issue in every relevant population. This is especially
true because the individual might care about the approval pattern in her own community, and the poll surveyed people in some larger area, like the entire state. Second, when the poll exists, the public does not always read about or remember it.
Third, sometimes there are conflicting polls, so that the individual must either average the two or apply some methodological criteria for deciding which is the superior
poll. The public may also be skeptical of polls, perhaps aware that the outcome is
sensitive to the exact wording of the question. Related to methodology, individuals
are not always honest in stating their opinions to pollsters, for reasons I discuss infra
notes 42-49 and accompanying text, so reliance on a scientifically valid poll may not
prevent mistakes. Finally, all of these concerns are magnified when the issue is not a
simple dichotomy-that one is "for" or "against"-but one in which the attitudes of
approval or disapproval are spread out over a continuum. The natural result is that
people make mistakes.
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information from people who are unusually disapproving of the
behavior, there is another person who gathers information from
people who are usually approving (or at least tolerant) of the
behavior. Mistakes of one sort are balanced by mistakes of another sort. But even on this fairly optimistic account, it is still the
case that most people over- or underestimate the current level of
approval or disapproval for the given behavior.
There are several reasons why the error may be skewed in one
direction rather than random. One reason might be that the underlying approval pattern changes faster than the beliefs about
the approval pattern. If the approval pattern had been stable for
a time, individuals might be slow to recognize a change. At each
moment, everyone gives excessive weight to the approval pattern
in the last time period. The group thus tends to underestimate a
rising level of (dis)approval and to overestimate a falling level of
(dis)approval. The lag in beliefs, however, would normally be
temporary. Absent some other factor, we would expect beliefs to
eventually catch up with actual approval patterns, with the mean
belief equaling the actual pattern.
However, another factor could more permanently skew the beliefs about what is approved and disapproved. Here we return to
Elster's objection: even if collective ignorance is not the only
possible equilibrium, it is a possible outcome. One individual
may be afraid of speaking out against what she perceives to be
the consensus. If enough individuals are unwilling to challenge
what appears to be the prevailing view, no one learns that it really is not the prevailing view.
There is an interesting confluence of writing on this "Emperor's New Clothes" phenomenon.4 2 The economist Timur
Kuran refers to "the act of misrepresenting one's genuine wants
under perceived social pressures" as "preference falsification."4 3
Similarly, social psychologists use the term "pluralistic ignorance" to refer to the outcome "in which virtually every member
of a group or society privately rejects a belief, opinion, or practice, yet believes that virtually every other member privately ac42 Much of the law and norms literature comments on it. See, e.g., Lessig, supra
note 3, at 997-99 (1995); McAdams, supra note 11, 144 U. PA. L. REV. at 2259; Eric
Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1716-18
(1996).

43 TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION

3 (1995).
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cepts it."" Because everyone pretends to support the existing
norm, everyone thinks that they will be disapproved for acting or
speaking contrary to the norm, even though private support is
largely absent.
The psychology literature documents several cases where preference falsification or pluralistic ignorance created an equilib-

rium in which people misperceived the common view. Perhaps
the first finding comes from Schanck, who in 1932 reported on
the attitudes about theatre-going and card playing that he surveyed in a small community dominated by the Methodist
church.4 5 A large majority of community residents reported private attitudes that were more tolerant of these activities than the
norm they believed their community endorsed. Another example concerns the Jim Crow South, where private white support
for state-mandated segregation eroded well before there was any
willingness to question segregation publicly.46 Contemporary examples of pluralistic ignorance include the belief among college
students that their classmates approve of drinking more than
they actually do4 7 and the belief among southern males that
others approve of violent responses to insults (or disapprove of
44 "The term pluralistic ignorance is something of a misnomer, for in these cases,
group members are not, in fact, ignorant of one another's private sentiments; rather,
they think they know, but are mistaken." Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller,
PluralisticIgnorance and the Perpetuation of Social Norms by Unwitting Actors, 28

ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 161 (1996); see also Dale T. Miller

& Deborah A. Prentice, Collective Errors and Errors About the Collective, 20 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 541 (1994).
45 Richard Louis Schanck, A Study of A Community and Its Groups and Institutions Conceived of as Behaviors of Individuals, 43 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 42-45,
56-58 (1932).
46 See James M. Fields & Howard Schuman, Public Beliefs and the Beliefs of the
Public, 40 PUB. OPINION Q. 427 (1976); Hubert J. O'Gorman & Stephen L. Garry,
PluralisticIgnorance-A Replication and Extension, 40 PUB. OPINION Q. 449 (1976);
Hubert J. O'Gorman, PluralisticIgnorance and White Estimates of White Support for
Racial Segregation, 39 PUB. OPINION Q. 313 (1975); see also KURAN, supra note 43,
at 316-17.
47 Psychologists find that pluralistic ignorance causes higher levels of alcohol consumption on college campuses than would otherwise occur. Individuals believe that
their less approving view of alcohol is deviant and therefore conceal it, reinforcing
the general perception that drinking is highly approved. See Prentice & Miller,
supra note 44, at 165-88; Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, PluralisticIgnorance and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social
Norm, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 243, 245 (1993) (finding that students
"were much less comfortable with the alcohol drinking habits of [fellow] Princeton
undergraduates than they believed the average student to be").
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non-violent responses) more than they actually do.4 8 Similarly,
Kuran uses the idea of preference falsification to explain strong
public support for communist regimes in eastern Europe and the

former Soviet Union, that existed in the absence of parallel private support.4 9
To summarize, an individual cares what others approve and
disapprove, yet lacks perfect information about this fact. A particular problem is that others may seek to conceal their evaluative judgments. As a result, we can say there is a "demand" for
information about what others approve and disapprove. The

next section contends that, intentionally or not, government actions often "supply" the desired information.5 °
C. The Expressive Power of Law: Legislation Signals Popular
Preferences and Beliefs
The utilitarian analysis of law is dominated by a focus on legal
sanctions. The above analysis, however, begins to reveal how law
might have a significant expressive effect, an effect dependent
not on the legal sanction but on what the law says. Law signals
the existence of information held by the law-maker. In particular, democratically enacted legislation provides information
about what elected representatives believe their constituents approve and disapprove. Because legislators have a professional

interest in correctly judging approval patterns, their enactments
48

Joseph A. Vandello and Dov Cohen, Pluralistic Ignorance and the Perpetuation
of Norms about Male Aggression (unpublished manuscript, 1999); Dov Cohen &
Joseph A. Vandello, Honor and "Faking" Honorability, in THE BIOLOGY OF BELIEF
(R. Nesse, ed., forthcoming). The same might have been true of the practice of
dueling, in the South and elsewhere. The willingness to challenge others escalated
so that, in the latter stages of the institution, when trivial slights produced a duel,
most parties may have preferred to abandon the practice but no party would suffer
the indignity of saying so publicly. See Hardin, supra note 21, at 93, 101-02; Lessig,
supra note 3, at 970.
49 See KURAN, supra note 43, at 118-27. Kuran's other main examples are the
persistance of India's caste system, id. at 128-36, and what he describes as "the unwanted spread of affirmative action." Id. at 137-54. In each case, he says that social
pressures operated to constrain criticism of a practice that lacked private support.
50 Various private institutions in civil society provide the same sort of information
about social attitudes. A social club, firm, or university might signal the attitudes of,
respectively, its members, employees, or alumni, by the regulations it adopts or
other actions it takes. The legislature seems to have a comparative advantage over
private entities in publicizing attitudinal information concerning an entire community or society, but I make no strong claim that government is necessary in this
respect. I am content to show that one effect of law is to provide such information
and therefore to influence behavior apart from sanctions.
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reveal their private information about such patterns. The law,
not the sanction, then influences behavior by causing people to
update their prior beliefs about what others approve and
disapprove.
The claim assumes that legislators signal their beliefs about social approval patterns when they vote for or against legislation.
This will be true if democratic elections effectively threaten incumbent legislators who act contrary to majority preferences. If
legislators fear that frustrating popular sentiment will cost them
their jobs, then legislators have a strong incentive to invest in
gathering information about popular preferences. Note here the
role of the secret ballot: by removing social pressures from the
voter, the voter has no reason not to express her true preference.
Elected politicians then have a great incentive to find out what
people actually approve or disapprove, rather than what they
pretend to approve and disapprove. Politicians who correctly detect a state of "pluralistic ignorance" gain an electoral advantage
over those who do not. If voters turn out of office those who
ignore or misjudge popular preferences, then individuals with a
comparative advantage at gathering and interpreting such information will dominate legislative bodies. In sum, if legislators cater to popular opinion, then legislative outcomes provide signals
of what those legislators believe about public preferences. 51
We should examine the claim I am making in light of public
choice theory to determine whether that body of scholarship
rules out an expressive theory of law based on the informational
content of legislation. After concluding that the attitudinal theory is consistent with public choice literature, I provide a more
precise description of the manner in which legislation signals
public attitudes.

51 As I have emphasized, legislators will typically be better than private citizens at
correctly ascertaining public opinion. But legislation can serve as a signal of public
opinion even if legislators have no such comparative advantage. Even if the average
private citizen is equally likely to be right about public opinion as the average legislator, the aggregation of hundreds of legislative votes will be informative because a
majority of legislators is more likely to be right than any one citizen. This point
follows from the Condorcet Jury theorem. See Dharmapala & McAdams, supra
note 4. Of course, if private citizens were as knowledgeable as legislators about
public opinion, then an equal aggregation of their opinions would be equally as informative. But the expressive effect on behavior depends also on how publicized
the aggregation is, and legislation is typically more publicized than private aggregations. See supra note 41.
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1. Public Choice Theory and the Relationship Between
Legislation and Public Opinion
It would be naive to deny that elected representatives sometimes feel immune from popular pressure. Legislators know that
many citizens do not vote and those that do have imperfect information about how their representative has voted on or otherwise
influenced legislation.5 2 Even if the citizen knows what her representative did, she also has imperfect information about
whether the result was desirable. Perhaps the legislator had investigated the matter, possessed superior information, and acted
paternalistically in the voter's interest.5 3 Finally, when the citizen
enters the voting booth with the thought of ousting her representative in retaliation for some legislative act, she will have only a
limited range of electoral options. Even if the voter disapproves
of many of the incumbent's votes, she may still think herself better off with the incumbent than the challenger.54 For these reasons, Timur Kuran believes that democratic processes often fail
to reveal or displace pluralistic ignorance.
Not only do these limitations weaken the connection between
majority preferences and legislative outcomes, but there are
strong non-majoritarian influences over legislation. Here enters
public choice theory and the problem of "rent-seeking." Rentseeking occurs when a well-organized but narrow interest group
exploits these limitations to secure a legislative transfer of material wealth from a larger and poorly organized majority. Public
choice scholarship documents this old story and explains how it
occurs. The obvious point is that lobbying groups influence legislators with campaign contributions and other favors. Less obvi52 Given a complex committee structure, bi-cameralism, the influence of political
parties, and other features of legislative assemblies, a minority can defeat legislation
and it is difficult for a voter to assess her representative's responsibility for a legislative outcome. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the responsibility the legislature
bears for certain policy outcomes, given that the legislature shares power with other
branches of government and that some problems have no governmental solutions.
53 The idea that legislators act for their view of the public interest, or other reasons besides the satisfaction of public opinion, suggests another signaling theory of
expressive law: that legislation signals information about the costs and benefits of
the behavior being regulated. Dhammika Dharmapala and I pursue this idea in
Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 4.
54 Election candidates typically differ from each other in very complex ways.
Thus, a legislator can vote against popular preferences on some issues but still expect to win if his overall package of representation is better than the package of
representation his electoral opponent will offer.
55 See KURAN, supra note 43, at 91-93.
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ous before public choice theory was the relevance of a collective
action problem. Namely, it is easier to organize 100 actors to
secure legislation giving each a $10,000 benefit than it is to organize in opposition 100 million taxpayers who will each lose one
cent.
Does public choice theory rule out the signaling model
presented here? Only if legislators are so effectively insulated
from diffuse public opinion that they are actually indifferent to it.
Some public choice theorists seem to think that this is true that
legislators care only about organized interest groups who can
provide the money and other favors that determine the outcome
of elections. If this strong thesis were correct, legislators would
not gather information on majority preferences and citizens
would not view legislation as a signal of those preferences. There
would be no room for the expressive effect I am claiming.
Like others, however, I reject this strong thesis.5 6 I will not
here review the extensive public choice literature, but I believe it
demonstrates only the weaker (but still extremely important)
point that interest groups wield disproportionate power in legislatures and that, despite appearances, many enactments are the
product of interest group rent-seeking. At the same time, diffuse
public opinion still threatens incumbents and thereby exerts an
influence on legislation. If so, then we should expect legislative
enactments are, as a whole, positively correlated with popular
opinion. If legislators bear a cost by acting contrary to public
opinion, then rent-seekers will be more successful enacting legislation over popular ambivalence than popular opposition. Stated
differently, the cost interest groups bear in securing legislation
goes down as the popular opposition goes down.57 The result
suffices to create a positive correlation between legislation and
popular opinion, which in turn is sufficient (I argue below) to
create an expressive effect.
I need not, however, defend a claim even this broad as a nar56

See, e.g.,

GEOFFREY BRENNAN

&

LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECI-

SION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE (1993); DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 21-33 (1991).

57 For example, if the public wants environmental protection and crime control, it
is much easier for politicians to redistribute benefits to organized interests through
environmental and crime legislation. If the public opposes health insurance regulations or gun control, it is much more difficult for organized interests to entice legislators into enacting such legislation. What gets passed remains correlated to what the
diffuse public wants.
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 361 2000

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79, 2000]

rower claim suffices. Suppose, contrary to the point just made,
that legislation as a whole is not positively correlated with popular opinions. In this scenario, there is still an expressive effect if
there are categories of legislation that are positively correlated
with popular opinion and the public can recognize these categories. There are at least two reasons to believe that such categories of legislation exist.
Initially, note that the interest group account of legislation is
most compelling for legislative provisions that escape public scrutiny. When a legislator predicts that the media will not widely
report an enactment or a specific provision of an enactment, she
has no reason to fear public reaction. Accordingly, in these
cases, narrow interest groups might fully control the legislative
process. This concession, however, is not much of a limit to an
expressive theory of law. Even if interest groups had no power
over legislatures, a law the public generally fails to notice can
hardly be expected to have an expressive effect.
By contrast, consider the category of "publicized legislation,"
i.e., pending bills where legislators believe either that the media
is widely publicizing the legislative activity or that the media will
widely publicize the ultimate legislative outcome. In these cases,
legislators do have reason to fear diffuse public opinion. Even if
there is no positive correlation between popular opinion and all
legislation, there will be a positive correlation between popular
opinion and publicized legislation. And because the public by
definition does not notice unpublicized legislation, it will tend to
observe from the legislation it does notice a positive correlation
with popular opinion. Such legislation can then produce an expressive effect. 58
Even this claim can be further refined. Among all publicized
legislation, there are some cases in which the public perceives
that popular support was essential to the outcome. At the risk of
using the term unconventionally, I will call this legislation "populist." Legislation is populist, in the sense I intend,5 9 if it is enacted without having been championed by an interest group with
58 This category is substantial. Politicians attempt to conceal the private interest
in some legislative provision by concealing the provision or shrouding it in a plausible claim of public interest. Given the limited attention many voters give to such
matters, these tactics sometimes work. But they often do not work because other
politicians stand ready to expose them for political advantage. It remains easier for
narrow groups to secure legislation that carries less risk of being exposed as such.
59 My discussions with Dhammika Darmapala helped me refine this point.
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a material stake in the legislative outcome or where there were
interest groups on both sides of the legislative battle but the
clearly weaker interest group won (either of which would be impossible if the strong public choice thesis were true). In either
case, when the public does not perceive that a concentrated interest group produced the legislation, the strong inference is that
diffuse public opinion did. Thus, by definition, there is a strong
correlation between populist legislation and popular opinion.
Perhaps the best example of populist legislation occurs where
the legislature enacts the law over the one-sided opposition of
organized interest groups. In these one-sided cases, the fact that
an interest group unopposed by other interest groups still managed to lose a legislative battle demonstrates that the legislative
enactment must be very strongly supported by diffuse public
opinion. Anti-public smoking ordinances provide an example.
The financially interested lobbying groups were the tobacco industry and possibly restaurant and bar owners. The fact that legislatures (including city councils) acted notwithstanding this
organized opposition strongly demonstrates that legislators believed that public opinion supported the bans.
Another example of populist legislation is purely symbolic legislation, where the law does nothing to redistribute material
wealth. In these cases, there are no interest groups competing
over economic rents, so the outcome will be highly correlated
with the number of voters who prefer the "symbol" being enacted.6 ° To state the obvious, absent judicial interference, a city
council is more likely to place on public land the symbols of the
majority religion than the symbols of some minority religion.
Likewise, a state legislature is more likely to enact laws that symbolically oppose abortion if the majority of state voters oppose
abortion, or to enact a state holiday in honor of a Confederate
general if the majority of voters view Southern history predominantly as a source of pride.
As stated above, the correlation in these cases is between legislative outcomes and actual public opinion. The pressure created
by diffuse public opinion comes from the action of voters. Given
60 The correlation will not be perfect because there may still be differences in how
well organized the different ideological interest groups are. But the primary reason
some interest groups are well organized is the material reward well-organized
groups gain from rent-seeking legislation. When we say there is no prospect for
material gain, the organizational differences between interest groups should be
smaller.
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the secret ballot, no one knows how an individual votes, and
there is, therefore, no social pressure to prevent voters from expressing their genuine views. Legislators therefore wish to cater
to the genuine views and to avoid acting on behalf of publicly
stated but privately rejected views. Moreover, legislators will
seek to determine when a state of pluralistic ignorance exists, because those who correctly ascertain the private views will gain an
electoral advantage. If legislators are sufficiently informed, they
may enact legislation that appears to many to be contrary to the
public view, but is actually supported by it.
In sum, there are categories of legislation that are positively
correlated with actual public opinion. The narrow claim is that
this correlation exists for "populist" legislation enacted without
having been championed by an interest group with a material
stake in the outcome, which occurs when legislation is purely
symbolic or is enacted over the one-sided opposition of interest
groups. The broad claim is that this correlation exists whenever
the legislation is publicized because in this case incumbents fear
offending public opinion.6 1
2.

Legislative Signals and the Updating of Private Beliefs
about Public Opinion

Assume, then, that publicized legislation (or a recognizable
subcategory thereof) is positively correlated with actual public
attitudes. This correlation makes publicized legislative decisions
a signal of popular attitudes. Under this assumption, the absence
of legislation regulating a given behavior signals that legislators
tend not to believe there is a strong societal consensus for regulating that behavior. Correspondingly, the enactment of legisla61 Public choice theory also challenges the ability of legislators to aggregate indi-

vidual preferences. For a general introduction, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note
56, at 38-42. A famous part of the problem is the voting paradox or legislative cycling, in which no policy position can sustain a legislative majority against all possible alternatives. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social

Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994). Arrow's Impossibility Theorem shows that one
cannot avoid legislative cycling without giving up some normatively attractive governance criterion. Some view the problem as fundamental, making incoherent the
idea of the "public interest" and making chaotic the work of legislatures. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE

137

(1982). Again, I will not argue the issue but only note my agreement with those who
say that legislative mechanisms restrain cycling without completely disconnecting
legislative outcomes from popular opinion. See, e.g., Stearns, supra; FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 56, at 47-62.
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tion in some subsequent time period signals that legislators tend
to believe in the existence of such a consensus. New legislation
causes individuals to update their prior beliefs about the approval pattern.6 2
If legislation is correlated with popular opinion, this effect is
fairly intuitive. Before the legislation passes, the correlation implies the absence of popular support. After the passage of legislation, the correlation implies the presence of popular support. I
will make the point a little more precise with two informal models, both of which are useful even if they do not describe the
conscious thought processes of the individual concerned.
First, suppose we define the relevant belief, b, as what an individual believes is the percentage of the population who disapproves of a given behavior. For concreteness, assume that the
behavior is public smoking or the failure to clean up after one's
dog. Assume that individuals are aware, prior to the enactment
of legislation, that the law permits them to smoke in public and
not to clean up after their dogs. The absence of legislative action
is one of the factors affecting b. In an extremely simple model,
we might imagine that the individual believes that there is a single trigger point, t, at which the legislature acts. (For example, if
the legislature acts to prohibit a behavior when 60% of the population disapproves of it, then t = 0.6.) For that individual, the
absence of legislation signals that public disapproval is less than
t, while the enactment of legislation signals that public disapproval is equal to or greater than t. The individual need not believe the legislature is infallible, but she will adjust her own
beliefs according to the signal that is sent.
The same is true if we more realistically imagine that the individual believes that legislation is correlated with public opinion,
but that there is no precise trigger point at which legislation occurs. Here, we use Bayesian updating of probabilities. 63 To do
so, let us redefine b as what an individual believes is the
probability that the community, in the aggregate, strongly disapproves of the behavior. For our purposes, it does not matter exactly how we define when "strong disapproval" exists, but we
64
mean some specific, measurable level of aggregate disapproval.
62 Although my focus is the expressive power of law, non-governmental actors can
produce the same effect. See supra note 50.
63
See PETER M. LEE, BAYESIAN STATISTICS (1989).
64 For simplicity, we might just consider the percentage of the population that
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Suppose that, prior to legislation, b = 0.4, meaning the individual
believes it is 40% likely that the public strongly disapproves of
the behavior. For this example, assume that a 40% likelihood is
not a sufficient probability to cause the individual to forgo the
behavior.
We must now define a second belief concerning the correlation
between popular opinion and legislation. Let us express this
judgment as a function of two conditional probabilities: (i) what
the individual believes is the probability that the legislature will
enact a law against behavior X, given that the community
strongly disapproves of it, and (ii) what the individual believes is
the probability that the legislature will enact a law against behavior X, given that the community does not strongly disapprove of
it. If the individual believes in the requisite correlation between
popular attitudes and legislative action, then she necessarily believes that the first conditional probability is higher than the second. Suppose the individual believes the first probability is 0.6
and the second is 0.3.
Now suppose that the individual observes the enactment of
legislation prohibiting X. She previously believed that the
probability of strong community disapproval was 0.4. But given
her observation, she wants to know the probability that the community strongly disapproves the behavior, given that the legislature has enacted a law against it. Using Bayes formula, the
answer is 57%, which is much higher than her initial belief of
40%.65 This difference in beliefs could easily change the individual's behavior. While she was willing to run the prior risk of
disapprove the behavior and understand "strong disapproval" as meaning that a
specified percentage-well above half-disapprove. More appropriately, we would
take account of the intensity of disapproval and the aggregate disapproval might be
expressed by an expected monetary loss. For example, "strong disapproval" might
mean that one detected instance of the behavior generates an expected approval loss
equal to $100.
65 Event (A) is that the community strongly disapproves behavior X. Event (B) is
that the legislature enacts a law against X. We have said that the individual initially
believes that the probability of event (A)-P(A)-is equal to 0.4 (which means that
P (NOT A) equals 0.6). We have also said that the individual believes that (i) the
probability that the legislature enacts the law given that the community strongly
disapproves of the behavior-P(B-A)-is equal to 0.6; and (ii) the probability that
the legislature enacts the law given that the community does not strongly disapprove
of the behavior-P(B-NOT A)-is equal to 0.3. The question is: what is P(A-B),
i.e,, the probability that the community strongly disapproves the behavior given that
the legislature enacted a law against it? Bayes Theorem says P(A-B) = P(A)P(BA) / P(A)P(B-A) + P(NOT A) P(B-NOT A). Given our initial values, the updated probability is 0.57.
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 366 2000

An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law

strong disapproval, the higher risk of strong disapproval may
prove too much. We can generalize this result. Whenever there
is a positive correlation between popular opinion and publicized
legislation, the individual will always update her beliefs in the
same direction, believing it to be more likely that there is strong
disapproval when the legislature has acted to prohibit the behavior than when it has not.66 For a law prohibiting behavior, people

will tend to believe there is greater disapproval of such behavior
than they previously thought. Accordingly, prohibitory legislation tends to suppress behavior expressively by raising the expected disapproval costs.
Like other theories of expressive law, the claim here is specu-

lative. This Article is an exercise in hypothesis building rather
than hypothesis testing. But specifying the causal mechanism for
expressive law should prove useful for identifying the path for
empirical work (and also raises some implications for law that I
explore in the next section). I will mention, however, two pieces

of indirect evidence that, when viewed together, support the attitudinal theory.

First, a common finding in public opinion surveys is that the
race or gender or other factors about the questioner affect the
answers given. 67 This result is consistent with the idea that people value approval. Survey respondents make inferences about
66 Using the Bayes Theorem terminology of the prior footnote, the claim is that
P(A-B) > P(A) whenever P(B-A) > P(B-NOT A). The former equation represents the fact that the updated belief is a probability greater than the one represented by the prior belief. The latter equation represents the condition under which
the former equation holds: what the text calls a positive correlation, meaning that
the probability that the legislature will enact a law against X, given that the community strongly disapproves of it, is greater than the probability that the legislature will
enact a law against behavior X, given that the community does not strongly disapprove of it. Some simple algebra demonstrates that P(B-A) > P(B-NOT A) implies that P(B-A) > P(A), thus proving the claim:
(1) P(BIA)
> P(BINOT A)
(2) [1 -P(A)] P(B IA)
> [1 - P(A)] P(B NOT A)
(3) P(B A) - P(A)P(B IA)
> [1 - P(A)) P(B NOT A)
(4) P(B A)
> P(A)P(B IA) + [(1 - P(A)]P(B INOT A)
Substituting P(NOT A) for (1 - P(A)), we get:
(5) P(B IA)
> P(A)P(B IA) + P(NOT A)P(B INOT A)
(6) P(A)P(B IA)
> P(A)[P(A)P(B A) + P(NOT A)P(B INOT A)]
(7)
P(A)P(B IA)
> P(A)
P(A)P(B IA) + P(NOT A)P(B I NOT A)
Substituting Bayes Theorem from the prior note, we get:
(8) P(A IB)
> P(A).
67 See, e.g., Darren W. Davis, The Directionof Race of Interviewer Effects Among

African-Americans: Donning the Black Mask, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 309 (1997); Nora
Cate Schaeffer, Evaluating Race-of-Interviewer Effects in a National Survey, 8 Soc.
METHODS & RES. 400 (1980).
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what answers the surveyor will approve and are more likely to
give those answers. In that light, the following finding by political scientists Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza takes on special
significance.6 8
Shortly before 1993, Sniderman and Piazza asked a large number of subjects whether they favored minority set-aside programs. However, they first randomly divided the subjects into
two groups. One group was initially told that "[t]he Congress of
the United States-both the House of Representatives and the
Senate-have passed laws to ensure that a certain number of federal contracts go to minority contractors. 6 9 The other half was
simply told that "[s]ometimes you hear it said that there should
be a law to ensure that a certain number of federal contracts go
to minority contractors. '"70 For all subjects, the survey continued
that "[w]e'd like to know what YOU think. Do you think that
such a law is a good idea or a bad idea?"'" The answers the two
groups gave were significantly different. Fifty-seven percent of
those told that Congress had enacted the law said it was a good
idea, while only forty-three percent of the other group indicated
approval.7 2
My interpretation of these results is that the subjects told of
Congressional action used it as evidence to infer what answer the
average person, including the interviewer, might approve or disapprove. The fourteen percent difference in response indicates a
substantial effect in what people are willing to say they approve,
which reflects that believing the existence of a law creates a significantly different belief about what others will approve.73
Second, experiments demonstrate that the mere publicity of
68 PAUL M.

SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE

69

Id. at 193.

70

Id.

(1993).

71 Id. at 131-33, 193 (question 52).
72 Id. at 133. Because the individuals were selected randomly for each group,
there is every reason to think that the differences in their answers are caused by the

differences in the statement introducing the question rather than differences in other
factors concerning the individuals in each group.
73 The 14% difference is especially significant given that some of the people in the
group not told of the law probably already knew it existed. Thus, the results probably understate the effect that would occur if everyone in one group believed there
was no law and everyone in the other group knew there was one. The survey also
demonstrates a second important point. Public opinion polls about affirmative action attitudes are fairly common. The results of this survey show that, notwithstanding such information, information about legislation can additionally affect one's
beliefs about what others approve. See supra note 41.
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disapproval affects behavior. Social psychologists studying litter,
for example, have been able to manipulate the amount of littering solely by publicity campaigns where the only information
conveyed is about the social disapproval of littering."4 These
studies are entirely consistent with the general findings that people obey law, in part, due to their fear of disapproval and that
individuals who believe that others will disapprove a particular
75
legal violation are more likely to comply.
Together, the survey and experimental results provide some
support for the attitudinal model of expressive law. The survey
supports the claim that people infer from legislation a greater
level of popular approval or disapproval, while the experiments
support the claim that a change in beliefs about public approval
will change behavior. The evidence, though not powerful, does
suggest that proscriptive legislation signals expected disapproval
and thereby generates some compliance independent of its
sanction.
3. Expressive Power, Discontinuities, and Norms
The model is essentially complete, but I want to explain how
the expressive function can generate either large or small
changes in behavior. In simple cases, the expressive effect of law
produces only a marginal change in beliefs, which in turn produces only a marginal change in behavior-a small boost to legal
compliance. The magnitude of the attitudinal signaling effect is
equal to the difference in actual legal compliance and the amount
that we would predict from deterrence by state-imposed sanctions or other expressive effects. Although small differences in
compliance are important, the effect may be fairly small because
74 See Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, 24
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 201 (1991); Harold G. Grasmick et al.,
Shame and Embarrassmentas Deterrents to Noncompliance with the Law: The Case
of an Antilittering Campaign, 23 ENV'T & BEHAV. 233 (1991).
75 See, e.g., ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). Tyler's primary
finding is that perceived legitimacy explains self-reported compliance with laws concerning speeding, parking, noise, littering, drunk driving, and shop lifting. See id. at
57-64. But even though he found that respondents did not expect peer disapproval
for the first four of these offenses, id. at 44, peer disapproval still correlated with
overall legal compliance at significant levels. See id. at 45, 59, 238-39 n.2, 240 n.10;
see also id. at 63 (stating that peer disapproval "takes [the] place" of legitimacy
when the individual does not believe the legal system is legitimate).
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the new legislation may not dramatically change most people's
prior views about the approval pattern.
However, there are two instances where the expressive effect
might create a large-scale change in behavior. I will illustrate
both with the much discussed example of smoking laws. First, a
law may cause a large-scale change in beliefs if there had been a
state of pluralistic ignorance. Where there is a widespread and
false belief in a particular approval pattern, anything that signals
the real approval pattern reveals a very different set of social
costs and benefits than was previously understood. Timur Kuran
uses this idea and further elaborations to explain surprising political revolutions, such as the abrupt fall of the communist regimes
in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.76 A critical
event in such cases, Kuran argues, is the sudden widespread recognition of pervasive discontent which not only shatters the previous state of pluralistic ignorance, but also causes people to
disseminate, for the first time, critical facts and arguments about
the regime. If a legislature perceives a state of pluralistic ignorance and legislates in favor of the "silent" majority, it can
thereby signal an enormous disparity between the perceived and
actual approval pattern. The behavior effect could be quite
large.7 7 A possible example may be anti-smoking legislation, because, until many of the ordinances were enacted, neither smokers nor non-smokers were very aware of the rising attitudes
against public smoking.78
Second, the expressive effect of legislation can produce large
76 See KURAN, supra note 43, at 261-88.

77 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 illustrates a related, but distinct effect. Congress
imposed the Act's requirements on southern states even though their federal legislators strenuously opposed its enactment. Nonetheless, the law, possibly due to its
sanctions, produced some significant compliance. Once some form of segregation
was eliminated, however, it seemed easier for white Southerner's to discuss their
actual views about it. Thus it revealed a previously existing but underappreciated
level of white opposition to Jim Crow policies. See KURAN, supra note 43, at 317;

Lessig, supra note 3, at 965-67. For data on the pluralistic ignorance among white
southerners, see supra note 46.
78 See Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance
Without Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 69, 71-76

(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). Kagan and Skolnick state:
[F]ormal rules serve an important communication function, overcoming
the familiar problem of pluralistic ignorance and inaction. Even if, in 1983,
most nonsmokers (and many smokers) favored restrictions on smoking in
the workplace

. ..

individual nonsmokers may not have realized the extent

of support for such rules, and hence may not have felt emboldened to complain directly to smokers. The enactment of ordinances and workplace
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behavioral changes even though the changes in beliefs are small.
Sometimes a social situation has multiple equilibria and a small
change causes behavior to "tip" out of one equilibrium and into
another. This discontinuity is counterintuitive; one would more
readily imagine that a small change in belief produces a small
change in behavior, or possibly a brief deviation and return to
the original equilibrium. But the reason for the larger change is
a "feedback" effect. Feedback occurs when individuals approve
or disapprove of behavior in proportion to its frequency.
For example, in many cases, the more rare the disapproved behavior, the more "deviant" it seems and the more intense the
resulting disapproval. The feedback then occurs as follows: Step
One is an event-legislation-that signals a higher level of disapproval than previously believed. In reaction, Step Two is a marginal decrease in the more greatly disapproved behavior. In
reaction, Step Three is that this less frequent behavior now incurs
more intense disapproval. Step Three leads back to Step Two,
where more intense disapproval results in less of the behavior.
Step Two leads to Step Three again, and so on. The effect can
continue for some time until the social interaction reaches a new
and possibly very different equilibrium.
The expressive effect thus gives law a significant potential for
managing norms. One of the necessary conditions for a norm is
that people generally realize that others will, at the least, approve
or disapprove of them for engaging in certain conduct.7 9 Where
the approval pattern is not well known, a legislative proclamation
can publicize it and create a norm. Even where the approval pattern is already known and the norm exists, legislation can still
strengthen the norm by causing individuals to adjust upward
their beliefs about the strength of the consensus underlying the
norm.
Going back to the smoking example, suppose the local town
council passes an anti-smoking ordinance for restaurants. To isolate the expressive effects, suppose also that no one expects the
state to actually enforce the ordinance with fines or otherwise.
Therefore, the only reaction is that individuals revise upward
their beliefs about the expected disapproval from engaging in
rules told nonsmokers that they had a right to breathe air that was free of
smoke.
Id. at 86.
79 See McAdams, supra note 5, at 362-64.
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such conduct. By itself, this effect may be small and fail to produce substantial compliance. But the fact that some people comply means that the fewer people who do smoke in restaurants
garner a more intense level of disapproval. Non-smokers may
express this fact or smokers may simply observe that there are
fewer people smoking at any given time and infer the greater
level of disapproval. As a result, more smokers give up the activity in restaurants, leading to even more disapproval for those remaining. This produces another round of compliance; the final
result may be full compliance. The law then appears to have created an anti-smoking norm. On the attitudinal model, legislation
is indeed the catalyst for change but only because it is believed to
demonstrate (as it usually does reflect) a consensus against the
proscribed behavior.
To summarize the model: people care about attitudes of approval and disapproval, but make mistakes about such matters;
legislation is correlated with public attitudes so that the enactment of legislation provides a signal of public attitudes; and those
who observe the signal will update their prior beliefs about public attitudes in the direction of expecting more disapproval for
behavior the law condemns. Expecting disapproval for the behavior provides an incentive, independent of legal sanctions, to
comply with the law. Although the effect will usually be small, a
law may upset a state of pluralistic ignorance or create a feedback effect, thereby producing a discontinuously large change in
behavior. The particular explanation being offered-the signaling of approval attitudes-is independent of other expressive
effects.8 0

The attitudinal claim is, for example, fully independent of my claim that law can
serve as a focal point around which individuals coordinate. See McAdams, supra
note 3. Focal point theory does not require that individuals involved place any value
on approval or disapproval. The attitudinal model also contrasts with this Condorcetian claim that legislation signals, not popular attitudes, but the legislators' private information about the costs and benefits of the behavior being regulated. See
Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 4. Finally, the attitudinal model also differs
from the claim that individuals comply with law because they have internalized a
duty to obey law and feel guilt otherwise. See generally Cooter, supra note 3.
80
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II
EXTENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ATrITUDINAL THEORY OF
EXPRESSIVE LAW

Legislation influences behavior not only because it imposes
sanctions, but also because it signals patterns of public approval.
Thus, law matters for what it says in addition to what it does.
Economic analysis of law should not, therefore, assume the contrary and analyze only the deterrent (or other) effect of sanctions. Along with other causal theories,8 1 the attitudinal theory
recommends that economists make the consideration of the expressive consequences of law a standard component of their
models.
Beyond this simple but important point, the theory has three
specific implications that I explore in this Part. First, the attitudinal theory identifies factors that increase the expressive power of
legislation. Second, the theory suggests that judicial decisions
may also have an expressive effect, though a less reliable one
than legislatures. Finally, the theory predicts and explains political conflict over purely symbolic matters.
A.

Prescriptionsfor Maximizing Expressive Power: Locality
and Legitimacy

The attitudinal theory implies that two features of legislative
bodies will significantly determine the degree to which their law
has an expressive effect: their geographic scope and a particular
type of legislative "legitimacy."
With regard to the first feature, local legislative bodies have a
comparative advantage over state and national bodies because
their actions are a stronger signal of the local attitudes that matter most. An individual cares primarily about local attitudes because judgments of approval and disapproval are mostly local.
For example, when an individual dates a member of her own sex
or a different race, she worries about disapproval from the people who observe her behavior or may otherwise learn of it. Unless she is famous, very few people outside of her local
community will form any judgment about her because very few
people know her. For someone in the United States, the enact81 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 3, at 597-607; Dharmapala & McAdams, supra
note 4; McAdams, supra note 3.
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ments of Congress are more informative in predicting local attitudes than, say, the enactments of the Canadian parliament, but
are probably less informative than enactments of the state legislature, and certainly less informative than the local ordinances of
the city council. Other things equal, the attitudinal model
predicts a larger expressive effect from local laws than state or
federal laws, from local ordinances regulating smoking, recycling,
and dogs more than state or federal statutes regulating speeding,
motorcycle helmets or drunk driving.
The attitudinal theory also predicts the importance of a particular type of legislative "legitimacy." Psychologists have measured a connection between an individual's perception that a
government operates "legitimately" and the willingness of that
individual to comply with the government's laws.82 Legitimacy is
a rich and difficult concept that probably involves many different
elements. The attitudinal model identifies only one element but
one that can be measured quite precisely: the correlation an individual perceives between popular attitudes and legislative outcomes. The greater the perceived correlation, the stronger the
signal sent by legislative action. The stronger the signal, the
more people revise their prior beliefs, and the greater the expressive effect is on behavior. Thus, the more that individuals perceive that a particular legislature acts legitimately, in the specific
sense of representing majority preferences and opinions, the
greater the expressive effect. Conversely, the more that individuals perceive that a particular legislature is captured by "special
interests" and well-heeled lobbyists, the weaker the expressive
effect. The attitudinal model directly links an issue like campaign finance reform to the expressive power of law.
B.

The Expressive Effect of Judicial Decisions

When legal scholars talk of the expressive function of law, they
often mean the expressive function of court-made law.8 3 The
claim is that judicial pronouncements shape how individuals
frame social and political issues and otherwise have a powerful
symbolic effect on behavior. Because I developed the attitudinal
model in the context of legislative action, it seems to give no support to such claims. Indeed, if courts are "counter-majoritarian"
institutions, as much legal theory suggests, then judicial decisions
82 See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 75, at 40-68; Nadler, supra note 3.
83 See, e.g., Mazzone, supra note 3; Pildes, supra note 3; Posner, supra note 3.
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are not constrained by, and therefore cannot be a signal of, diffuse public attitudes. Under this line of thinking, the attitudinal
model predicts that judicial decisions have no expressive effect.
However, this judgment is too quick. Although the expressive
effect may be weaker, there are reasons to believe that popular
attitudes do constrain courts much of the time and therefore that
court decisions might, on average, signal such attitudes. Recall
that the attitudinal model predicts an expressive effect as long as
the decisions of the state actors are positively correlated with
popular approval. Even if the correlation is weaker with courts
than with legislatures, a positive correlation probably still exists,
as the following two points suggest.
First, the counter-majoritarian claim, even as applied to the
Supreme Court, is hotly disputed. Despite the theory that courts
85
84
should protect minority rights, many constitutional historians
and scholars of public opinion8 6 believe that the Supreme Court
more typically caters to majority preferences. Michael Klarman
puts it boldly:
The romantic image of the Court as countermajoritarian savior is shattered by historical reality. The Supreme Court sanctioned rather than attacked slavery, legitimized segregation
for much of the Jim Crow era, validated the Japanese-American internment during World War II, sanctioned McCarthyafter the
ism, and approved sex discrimination until
87
emergence of the modern women's movement.
84

CIAL

See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
REVIEW 75-77, 135-79 (1980).

AND DISTRUST:

A THEORY OF JUDI-

85 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS

(1991);

ROBERT

G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (1960); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); see
also Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
86

See, e.g.,

BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A.

IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT
ION AND THE SUPREME COURT

(2d ed. 1999);

JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES:

THOMAS

R.

MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPIN-

(1989); David G. Barnum & John L. Sullivan, The

Elusive Foundationsof Political Freedom in Britain and the United States, 52 J. POL.
719, 731-32 (1990); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957); Roy B. Flemming &

B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: IndividualJustice Responsiveness
to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. ScI. 468 (1997); Mark A. Graber, The

NonmajoritarianDifficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 35 (1993).
87 Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L.
REv. 145, 161 (1998).
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These scholars claim that many cases celebrated for protecting
minorities turn out, on closer inspection, to be far less "heroic." 8
Cases where the Supreme Court clearly frustrates public opinion,

such as school prayer, flag burning, and criminal procedure, are
exceptional. None of this should be surprising given that Supreme Court justices are nominated and confirmed by elected
officials and that justices prudently worry about the fragility of
their power. As a result, although the Court is countermajoritarian when compared to Congress, that does not mean its
decisions are negatively correlated or uncorrelated with public
attitudes. The same may be said of lower federal judges and
state court judges, especially those who are elected. 89 Thus, even
for constitutional law, judicial decisions may be positively correlated with popular attitudes.
The constitutional debate over the extent to which the Supreme Court is counter-majoritarian tends to obscure a second

point: that much of what courts do is not constitutional. Courts
See id.
The Brown decision was the product of a broad array of political, social,
economic and ideological forces inaugurated or accelerated by World War
II; by the time of the Court's intervention, half the nation no longer supported racial segregation. Similarly, Roe v. Wade was decided at the crest
of the modem women's movement and was supported by half the nation's
population from the day it was handed down. Finally, the Court protected
gay rights for the first time in Romer v. Evans only after a social and political gay rights movement had made substantial inroads against traditional
attitudes toward homosexuality.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Klarman substantiates his point about Brown in Michael J.
Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM.
HIST. 81 (1994) and Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7, 13-71 (1994). See also Klarman, supra note 85, at 7-8,
32-34 (arguing that Brown was not counter-majoritarian but followed broader social
changes on race relations); id. at 9-15, 34-46 (making the same argument regarding
sexual equality cases, privacy and sexual autonomy cases, and free speech cases); id.
at 15-16, 46-62 (discussing how Establishment Clause cases are only weakly countermajoritarian); id. at 62-66 (discussing how the criminal procedure revolution followed changes in societal attitudes about race and poverty, and an ideological revulsion to Nazi law enforcement). Klarman characterizes many of these cases as "the
justices' seizing upon a dominant national consensus and imposing it on resisting
local outliers." Id. at 16. In "less frequent[ ] and far more controversial[ ]"cases, in
which "the Court intervenes on issues where the nation is narrowly divided," the
justices appear to be anticipating (rightly or wrongly) a future trend. Id. at 17. He
concludes: "To risk putting the point somewhat cynically, the Court identifies and
protects minority rights only when a majority or near majority of the community has
come
to deem those rights worthy of protection." Id. at 17-18.
89
See Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice Model
of Judging and Its Implicationsfor the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1313
n.28 & 1328 n.91 (1997) (describing state rule for electing or appointing judges).
88
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interpret statutes and exercise common law powers. In both
cases, they are subject to being "overruled" by the legislature,
which has primacy in non-constitutional fields.
Two theories predict that courts would attempt to avoid issuing
rules that legislatures feel compelled to supplant. First, if judges
are motivated by prestige,9" they will presumably seek to avoid
the loss of prestige that occurs when legislators enact highly popular legislation that "corrects" a judicial decision. Another theory posits that judges seek to implement their own policy
preferences.9 1 If so, judges will get more of what they want if
they push the policy only slightly beyond what it desires. The
claim here is that legislatures can give attention to only a limited
number of issues and that they are more likely to allocate that
time to overruling judicial decisions the more those decisions deviate from legislative preferences. In other words, a statutory interpretation or common law rule is more likely to survive if it is
consistent with or only slightly offends the popular attitudes that
influence legislatures. Thus, under either a prestige model or a
policy preferences model, non-constitutional decisions are constrained by popular attitudes. More precisely, popular opinion
constrains publicized cases, but (as with legislation) law's expressive effect is, in any event, limited to cases that attract public
attention.92
90 See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PuB.
CHOICE 107, 129 (1983) (positing that "self-interested judges seek prestige");
Jonathan R. Macey, JudicialPreferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 631 (1994) (stating, among other motives, the judicial desire
for "reputation within the legal community"); Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel,
Reputation and Judicial Decision-making, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 38 (1994)
(stating, among other motives, the judicial desire for a reputation among her peers).
91 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice
Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm
and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263, 267 (1990); McNollgast, Politics
and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 n.10 (1995); Erin O'Hara, Social Constraintor Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L.
REV. 736, 738 (1993).
92 Several studies show that elected judges tend to cater to majority preferences in
high profile cases, e.g., the death penalty and abortion. See, e.g., Melinda Gann
Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case
Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1120-21 (1987); Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and JudicialPolitics in the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 49798 (1995). Rick Hasen claims that most cases have "low-salience" with the public,
and that in these matters, elected judges are likely to decide cases like appointed
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In sum, electoral pressures often influence the selection of
judges who, in turn, have independent reasons to avoid offending
popular attitudes, in constitutional as well as non-constitutional
law. The point is not that judges seek to satisfy popular attitudes
in every opinion-the contrary seem obvious-but that on average their opinions may reflect the attitudes of the society from
which the judge is drawn, and in which the judicial rules must
operate. The likely result is that judicial decisions are positively
correlated with popular attitudes. If so, the attitudinal model
says that such decisions are also a signal of popular attitudes and,
for that reason, that judicial opinions have an expressive effect
independent of the sanctions that enforce them. Of course, because judges do starkly deviate from popular attitudes on occasion, one can always seek to undermine the expressive effect of
particular judicial opinions by characterizing them, perhaps with
93
good reason, as being "out of touch" with the "mainstream.,
Thus the expressive effect of judicial opinions is weaker and
more contingent than it is with legislatures.
C. Symbolic Conflict: PoliticalStruggles to Capture the State's
Expressive Power
The final implication is symbolic conflict. If the attitudinal
model correctly explains how government action affects behavior
expressively, even without sanctions, then purely symbolic acts of
the government will also have this effect. Because government
expression influences behavior, we can more easily understand
why ideological interest groups invest so heavily in capturing and
exploiting the expressive power of the state. This section first
explains this positive claim-that groups seek government symbolism as a means of influencing behavior-and then discusses its
normative significance. In situations where interest groups will
seek an excessive level of influence over individual behavior, it is
desirable to limit government expression, including legal expression. In making this point, I discuss the obvious example of the
Establishment Clause, which in part limits the government's ability to express religious messages.
judges. See Hasen, supra note 89, at 1313-26. But as I note in the text, low salience
cases would not serve to have an expressive effect anyway.
93 See, e.g., Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster:
The U.S. Supreme Court,Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 751

(1989).
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1.

The Positive Theory: Government Symbols Affect Behavior

Political conflict is overtly symbolic when the individuals involved in the conflict recognize that the government action matters to each side primarily because of the values or ideas it
expresses. Such conflict is common. For example, when citizens
mobilize for or against the display of the confederate flag,94 or

for placing the Ten Commandments on government property,95
their conflict is symbolic in the narrow sense that it relates to an
object that is valued or opposed for its character as a symbol.
94 The NAACP recently led a tourism boycott of South Carolina because it continued to fly the Confederate Flag over its Statehouse. See Bob Edwards & Adam
Hochberg, Demonstrations Continue in Columbia (National Public Radio, Morning
Edition, Apr. 7, 2000) (reporting that "business leaders say [the boycott] has already
cost the state $10 million"). Flag opponents held two large rallies in 2000. One
began with a march from Charleston to Columbia and ended with a rally of 2000
flag-opponents and about 300 counter-demonstrators. Id.; Erik Neely & Rachel
Graves, A Journey of 109 Miles: Dueling Flag Rallies Greet March, THE POST &
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Apr. 7, 2000, at Al. After considerable legislative turmoil, on July 1, 2000, South Carolina permanently removed the flag from atop its
Statehouse dome and placed one permanently on a pole next to the Confederate
Soldiers' Monument on the Statehouse grounds. See Gene Crider, Just Two Flags
Fly Above Statehouse, THE HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), July 2, 2000, at 1A. This sort
of symbolic dispute is particularly common in the South, see F.T. McCarthy....
What Your Good Book Said: Southern History: The South's Old Symbols, THE
ECONOMIST, June 10, 2000, but it is pervasive throughout American and other societies. For an enlightening discussion, see SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE:
PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1998).
95 In 1995, Alabama Governor Fob James threatened to use the Alabama National Guard to protect a Ten Commandments plaque posted by a judge in county
court. See Ex parte State ex rel. James v. ACLU, 711 So. 2d 952, 962 (Ala. 1998)
(finding that constitutionality of judge's plaque was not justiciable); Alabama
Freethought Assoc. v. Moore, 893 F. Supp. 1522, 1544 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (finding
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the courtroom plaque). Recently, several
state legislatures enacted or began considering legislation authorizing displays of the
Ten Commandments in public buildings alongside other "historical documents." See
B.G. Gregg, Moral Code Gains Backing, THE DETROIT NEWS, March 31, 2000, at
Metro 1 (stating that 12 states have had such bills introduced in their legislature and
two states-Indiana and South Dakota-have enacted the provisions into law);
Robert Parham, Ten Commandments and A Number of Views, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 2, 2000, at Gi (reporting that U.S. House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly for such a bill). The courts are starting to hear the Establishment Clause
challenges to this practice. See, e.g., Doe v. Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d
667 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (granting preliminary injunction against public school displaying
Ten Commandments and other documents); Indiana Civil Liberties Union v.
O'Bannon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 842 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (granting preliminary injunction
against construction of monument displaying Ten Commandments on Statehouse
grounds). State mottos present similar issues. See, e.g., ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding unconstitutional the Ohio state motto "With God All Things Are Possible"), reh'g en banc
granted, 222 F.3d 268 (6th Cir. 2000).
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Although public choice theory recommends that one look care-

fully for the material interests behind legislative struggles, this
kind of controversy is not about manufacturers of flags and Ten

Commandment plaques attempting to induce the government to
buy their products.
In the same way, disputes over legislation prohibiting flag967
burning, 96 repealing an
unenforceable ban on miscegenation,9 7
opposing evolutionary theory, 98 or establishing a religious holiday99 are not about government re-allocation of material resources but concern the values and ideas these laws express.
Even legislation that appears to regulate conduct can be symbolic
in this narrow sense because the citizens who favor or oppose the
law recognize that it does little more than express values.1
Judge Richard Posner's dissent in Hope Clinic v. Ryan"0o char96 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding federal Flag Protection Act unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989) (holding that state could not constitutionally punish defendant for burning American flag during protest rally).
97 See Phillip W.D. Martin, Devoutly Dividing: U.S. Opponents of InterracialMarriage Say God Is On Their Side, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1999, at D1 (reporting

that Alabama voters expected to consider repealing their unenforceable ban on interracial marriage).
98 Some struggles are symbolic in the additional sense that the legislative branch
and informed observers probably know for certain that the judicial branch will invalidate the legislation if it passes. See, e.g., Brian Ford, Creation-EvolutionFuss Won't
Go Away, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 6, 2000 (reporting that Oklahoma House of Representatives passed bill 99-0 that would require that all science textbooks adopted by
the state contain "acknowledgement that human life was created by one God of the
universe").
99 See Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding constitutionality
of state statute creating public school holiday for the Friday before and the Monday
following Easter); Bridenbaugh v. O'Bannon, 185 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding constitutionality of state statute providing that Good Friday is a legal holiday for
state employees); Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the closing of county courts and administrative offices on Good Friday did not violate Establishment Clause); see also Laurie Goodstein, Bush's Jesus Day Is Called
Insensitive and a Violation of the First Amendment, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 6,
1999, 31, at A20 (describing controversy over Governor George W. Bush's proclamation "declaring June 10 to be Jesus Day, and urging all Texans to 'follow Christ's
example"').
100 For example, Dan Kahan argues that much of criminal punishment is expressive in content because people do not care much about the deterrent consequences
even though they pretend to. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 436-45 (1999) (discussing death penalty debate as
means of expressing values of competing social groups).
101 195 F.3d 857, 876, 879-81 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. granted
and judgment vacated, 120 S. Ct. 2738 (2000) (in light of Stenberg v. Carhart,120 S.
Ct. 2597 (2000), which held similar laws unconstitutional).
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acterized two states' partial birth abortion bans in these terms.
Finding that there could be no possible policy or moral difference
between the permitted and prohibited abortion techniques,
Judge Posner concluded that the law's proponents were "concerned with making a statement in an ongoing war for public
opinion, though an incidental effect may be to discourage some
late-term abortions."1 °2 In other words, the law was enacted
"merely for [its] symbolic or aspirational effect." 103
Symbolic governmental actions, and the controversy they generate, present something of a puzzle for economic analysis. Even
when the symbolic action involves legislation, it imposes no real
sanction and allocates no material resources. Why then do people invest so much in a purely symbolic struggle? One can give
an explanation based entirely on preferences. That is, some people have a preference for observing the Confederate or United
States flag in a position of authority and a preference against its
denigration. To satisfy this preference is then no different than
satisfying material preferences. One's ends-to observe the veneration or desecration of the symbol-make rational some degree of political involvement to achieve those ends. 04
However, this is not a very satisfying answer for two reasons.
First, it places substantial weight on preferences for the actions of
others, a form of "third-party" preference that economists usually think is not very intense. Why should people care so much
about what others do with their own flags? Second, it does not
explain why the government's actions are so important. Why are
individuals not content with bumper stickers and other private
speech? Often it seems to matter more to individuals what the
government says than what other private actors say, even if the
private actors speak as loud as or louder than the government.
The attitudinal theory offers a different explanation. The theory posits that people value symbolic government action (in part)
because it can change behavior. The point is not simply that A
and B struggle over what the government will say symbolically
because A likes the proposed symbol (gains utility from its display) and B dislikes it. In addition, A and B struggle because
they expect that the governmental symbol will change the behavId. at 880-81.
Id. at 881.
104 How the collective action problem is avoided is an interesting question I do
not address.
102
103
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10 5

ior of C.
This is the dynamic Judge Posner refers to when he says the
partial birth abortion laws are part of "an ongoing war for public
opinion."' 6 He suggests that abortion opponents use the law to
07
publicize the "ugliness" of abortion or a particular method
But that is not all. Given a positive correlation between public
attitudes and legislative action on publicized matters of symbolic
concern, the legislative condemnation signals disapproval of the
prohibited abortion method and, quite probably, abortion generally. When one side wins the legislative battle, it signals that
side's greater strength in numbers of adherents or the intensity of
their attitudes, either or both of which create greater social pressures for everyone to conform publicly to that side's view. Roe v.
Wade denies to pro-life voters a legislative prohibition on abortion enforced by criminal sanctions? °8 As a substitute, pro-life
voters seek to create or strengthen social norms against abortion.
One means toward this end is to enact legislation that condemns
abortion symbolically, thereby signaling a high level of private
disapproval for abortion.
While a group may use symbolic governmental action to
demonstrate its actual majority status, the struggle is not limited
to signaling true approval patterns. Ideological interest groups
would prefer to constitute a majority but will settle for creating
the appearance of being the majority. Creating pluralistic ignorance will serve the group's interests nearly as well because, as
noted above, this outcome can be stable and can substantially
influence behavior. For this reason, opposing groups vying for
public influence each will claim to represent the "mainstream."
More generally, the size of an interest group often becomes a
hotly contested issue, with a group expending significant effort in
claiming to have the largest possible membership. 9
We may then analogize to the public choice observation that
interest groups struggle to capture the legislature's power to re105 Why A and B care about the behavior of C may ultimately come back to a
story of the preferences of A and B. But conflict over government symbols matter
more and more obviously to those preferences if they affect behavior.
106 See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 880.
107 Id. at 879-80.
108 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

109 A frequent concern of protesters is that the media not underestimate and
under-report the number of participants in a march or rally. Similarly, the attempt
to estimate the number of gays and lesbians in the population is greatly contested.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 295 (1992).
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distribute material wealth. The attitudinal theory explains symbolic political struggle as the effort of interest groups to capture
the state's expressive power. This observation is not intended as
a complete explanation of the role of symbols in political life,
which are far more complex, but as a useful starting point for
economic analysis.
2.

The Normative Implication: ConstitutionalLimits to
Government Symbolism

Is it a good idea for the government to engage in symbolic action? The answer obviously depends on what one thinks of the
particular ends the government seeks to advance. The expressive
power is merely one means to influence behavior, and that
means can be put in service of good or bad ends. Although the
expressive law literature has focused more on the good ends to
which this power can be used, there is much to say about the bad
ends of symbolic governmental action.
I have argued elsewhere that selfish individuals often seek to
impose their third-party preferences on others via a norm. 110 If
approval matters, a majority of individuals may, by threatening
to deny approval, create norms that restrain the freedom of all
individuals, even though the minority loses more than the majority gains. A larger group of individuals who oppose inter-racial
dating, for example, might succeed in creating a norm that
caused others to refrain from the activity, even though the disutility to the few who prefer to date inter-racially exceeds the utility to the many who prefer that others do not. Although I make
the point in utilitarian terms, one might use any number of normative theories to evaluate and sometimes condemn a group or
societal norm. The relevance to the present discussion is that a
group having trouble creating or enforcing such an undesirable
norm may seek to do so by exploiting the expressive power of the
state. Given this sort of danger, we may hope that the expressive
powers of government, like other powers, are subject to constitutional constraints.
An interesting example of such a governmental limitation is
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. One category of
Establishment Clause cases consists of symbolic governmental
action, such as the display of a creche, cross, or menorah on gov110 See McAdams, supra note 5, at 412-19 (discussing "nosy" norms).
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ernment property."' In such cases, the Supreme Court often
uses an "endorsement test," which, as Justice O'Connor first
stated, asks whether the purpose of the government action is to
"endorse or disapprove of religion" or whether the effect is to
"convey[ ] a message of endorsement or disapproval. ' 112 Justice
O'Connor justified the test in the following oft-quoted passage:
"Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message. '"113 While a message of inequality is often
offensive, this passage does not explain exactly what about the
message is constitutionally deficient. In this brief space, I do not
intend to provide anything like a complete theory of the endorsement test, but only to explain how the attitudinal theory fits into
the literature on this subject.
One way to read Justice O'Connor's justification is that she
thinks the problem with endorsement is that it creates, or tends
to create, disutility for members of religious minorities.1 14 That
111 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)
(holding that Establishment Clause did not require removal of a Ku Klux Klan cross
from a plaza next to a state capital); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (holding permissible an 18-foot menorah at the entrance to a government
building placed next to a city-owned Christmas tree but impermissible a privatelyowned nativity scene on the main staircase of a county courthouse); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding constitutionality of a city-sponsored nativity
scene).
112 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court began to consider endorsement as part of its Establishment Clause test in School Dist. Of City of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). In Pinette, five Justices preferred the
endorsement test to the "Lemon" standard for a symbolism case (based on Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). More recently, however, the Court seemed to
reaffirm Lemon and view endorsement as a supplement or adjunct to its concerns.
See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997). For a description of the doctrinal evolution, see Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial
Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2124-37 (1996).
113 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 23 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he union
of church and state in pursuit of a common enterprise is likely to place the imprimatur of governmental approval upon the favored religion, conveying a message of
exclusion to all those who do not adhere to its tenets.").
114 Some may read Justice O'Connor's justification as condemning the message of
endorsement without regard to its consequences. Indeed, a number of theorists
posit the importance of "expressive" values in law precisely because they are independent of consequences. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 2. But Justice
O'Connor's concerns are probably, like my own, consequential. She certainly emphasizes the consequence of messages in the racial gerrymander case of Shaw v.
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is, outsiders feel bad about their second-class status. Perhaps this
is a sufficient basis for the endorsement test, but it raises some
troubling questions. Are religious minorities not already well acquainted with the fact that they are in the political minority?
Where the answer is yes, as it usually is, what is the incremental
harm of having government add one more symbol of the dominant religion? When a single religion pervades and dominates a
community, members of minority religions will likely feel politically subordinate and culturally excluded no matter what the
government expresses. In many American towns, for example, a
high proportion of residents decorate their homes and workplaces, including public accommodations like restaurants and
shopping malls, with symbols of Christianity, particularly during
Christmas and Easter. In these communities, it seems naive to
think that barring government expressions of Christianity will
prevent Christians from feeling like "insiders" and non-Christians from feeling like political and cultural "outsiders." Though
there may be good responses to this criticism, it does show the
value of exploring an alternative rationale for the endorsement
test, one that looks beyond the immediate reaction to the govern15
ment endorsement.
A better way to justify the endorsement test, possibly consistent with Justice O'Connor's language, is to focus on the ultimate
behavioral effect such endorsements can create. Christopher
Eisgruber takes this approach when he claims that "[t]he Establishment Clause turns out to have a surprising affinity to the Titles of Nobility Clauses," which prohibits Congress from granting

Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 631, 657 (1993) (noting that racial gerrymander "reinforces"
racial perceptions, "may exacerbate" racial voting, and "may balkanize us into competing racial factions"). In any event, the consequential caste-based theory of the
Establishment Clause is useful, regardless of Justice O'Connor's intent, because of
the difficulties that plague a non-consequentialist expressive theory of the Clause.
See Adler, supra note 2, at 1438-48.

115 This is a general point, not limited to the context of religion. For example,
some theorists usefully interpret political conflict as an effort by competing groups
or classes to establish their superiority to other groups or classes symbolically. See
JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986); Kahan, supra note 100. In these theories,
the group members seem to gain some immediate satisfaction from the fact that
their group's symbol, and not the other group's, is embodied in law. I wish merely to
add this additional layer to the analysis: that symbolic or expressive law is also valued because it influences the behaviors of the other group or of third parties.
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aristocratic titles to American citizens. 116 Eisgruber reads this
clause to illustrate the general principle that "[t]he Constitution
prohibits government from exercising any form of power likely
to create caste-based factions.""' 7 The problem in government
endorsement of religion is not that (or at least not only that) it
stigmatizes non-adherents, but rather that the message of insider/
outsider difference threatens to "create or reinforce the division
of American society along lines defined by religious differences."' 118 Given the historic and "severe threat posed by religious factions," the Establishment Clause forbids government
from actions, including symbolic ones, that "reinforce sectarian
divisions."11' 9 In sum, the Clause states an anti-caste principle. 2 °
This normative rationale for the Establishment Clause, however, requires a causal theory to explain how endorsement causes
factionalization. Perhaps the point seems so obvious as to need
no elaboration-government endorsement of religion makes
people "identify" more with their religion. But how does endorsement achieve this result? After all, one would not necessarily create a caste even if the law explicitly proclaimed one.' 2 '
I believe the attitudinal model usefully provides the causal
story. Religious symbolism is a means of influencing religious
behavior. A Christian symbol on government property signals
that Christians exercise political control over the relevant governmental body. Legislation creating a Christian religious holiday or moment of silence in majority-Christian schools signals
that popular attitudes favor Christian religious observances.
Most people already know that Christianity is the dominant religion in the United States, but the signal will still affect beliefs
and can still affect behavior. Individuals will believe that the approval of Christianity is higher after the signal than before it.
116 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Government, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1304 (1994).
117 Id. at 1302.
118 Id. at 1305.
119 Id. at 1305, 1306.

120 The objection raised in the prior paragraph does not apply to this rationale.
The objectionable end is not that religious minorities are made to see that they are
in the minority, so it does not matter that minority members already know this much
without the government symbol. The danger is the tendency of endorsements to
reinforce divisions that develop into castes.
121 Thus, I agree with Eisgruber that the tendency of governmental endorsements
to reinforce religious divisions "does not depend upon complex causal chains." Id.
at 1305. But I do not think those chains are entirely obvious.
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Given the signal, one expects greater approval from practicing
Christianity 2and
greater disapproval practicing other religions or
1 2
none at all.
There are several behavior consequences to events that raise
the social cost of being outside the majority religion, or, what is
the same thing, raise the social benefit of practicing the majority
religion. First, adherents to other religions feel some pressure to
avoid displaying their faith. Because they expect greater disapproval from revealing their beliefs, they make some effort to
avoid doing so. Second, non-believers-agnostics and atheistsfeel the same pressure to conceal their lack of religious faith.
This group includes those who were born into the majority religion, but who no longer practice it. Third, some majority adherents practice their religion in private. Individuals in this group
now feel some social pressure to practice their religion in a more
overt way to gain approval and avoid disapproval. All of this
describes a particular process by which individuals come to identify themselves and others more and more according to their religious differences. The end of this process of behavioral change
is a system where religious differences are so important that we
would call them a caste.
Stating the causal story exposes a potential weakness in the
anti-caste account. It is easy to invoke the ultimate fear-castein response to a minor example of government endorsement of
religion, but it is unlikely that any particular endorsement will
produce that result. One of the reasons courts find it difficult to
apply an endorsement analysis is this causal indeterminancy: no
one can state how much endorsement is necessary to produce a
substantially different social environment. No wonder then that
some judges apply the same test far more strictly than others.1 23
Worth noting, then, is the fact that religious symbols, like the
expressive effect generally, can create sharply discontinuous ef122 For example, in the absence of the signal, people may believe that observant
Christians themselves are only a plurality, not a majority. But the signal provides
evidence that observant Christians are more numerous than previously thought.
123 Justice Kennedy has complained that the cases rely on "little more than intuition and a tape measure." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 675 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Compare Elewski v. City of
Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004 (1998) (upholding
display of city-owned creche in public park because it was part of Syracuse's overall
downtown secular holiday display), with Chabad-Lubavitch v. City of Burlington,
936 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional the public display
of a menorah despite being "a few feet" away from secular holiday signs).
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fects on behavior. Recall the discussion above about the "feedback effect." The disapproval of minority religions or of atheism
may rise as more appear to practice the majority religion; the
fewer who deviate, the more deviant they seem. As a result, one
individual's religious behavior changes the social incentives for
others. In a community where Christianity is the dominant religion, if observant Christians begin to practice their faith more
openly, moving along the continuum from private to more public
observance, the level of disapproval for non-observance rises.
The same is true as non-observant Christians or observant nonChristians act to avoid being identified as such. As there appear
to be fewer and fewer people who are not enthusiastic public
supporters of the majority faith, the perceived disapproval for
everyone else rises. As the process continues, social behavior
may "tip" out of one equilibrium and into a very different one.12 4
For any particular symbol in any particular community, there is
no guarantee that this discontinuous effect will occur, but precisely because it is difficult to predict when it will, one might regard the government's use of religious symbols as generally
dangerous.
In sum, government symbols endorsing or disapproving a religion will lower or raise the social costs from openly practicing that
religion. 121 Signaling an approval pattern via government endorsement therefore affects religious behavior. Because of the
dangers of religious factionalization, the Establishment Clause
can plausibly be read to prohibit the government from lending to
a particular religion (or religion generally) its expressive power
to influence behavior. The same point can be made about the
anti-caste principle some theorists give for the Fourteenth
Amendment-that state segregation (or classification) by race
"can have no other result than . .. to keep alive a conflict of
races, the continuance of which must do harm to all con124 Timur Kuran discusses this sort of discontinuous process in his model of
"ethnification." See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through
Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1998).
125 Government expression is thus not so different than material subsidies or taxes
of religion. The theory here thus contrasts with those who attempt to explain all of
the Establishment Clause, even cases involving material subsidies, as deriving from
endorsement concerns. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal:
The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151 (1987). Instead of saying that the main problem is endorsement and subsidies are a form of endorsement, we could equally say that the
main problem is subsidy and endorsement is a form of subsidy.
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cerned."' 116 The attitudinal model helps to explain how legislation mandating segregation (and possibly other law) had that
reinforced,
effect: it signaled attitudes approving, and thereby
1 27
social norms of separation and discrimination.
CONCLUSION

The common claim that law works expressively, independent
of its sanctions, is too frequently left unexplained. In this Article,
I have focused on one possible causal explanation for how law
influences behavior by what it says. In a democratic society, legislation and other law can change what people believe about the
approval patterns in their community or society; the law operates
as a signal of popular opinion. Because people value approval,
intrinsically or instrumentally, such beliefs influence behavior.
Updating one's beliefs to account for the law, an individual will
infer the prospect of greater disapproval costs from behavior the
law condemns, which gives the individual an incentive to obey
the law that is independent of the legal sanctions.
Like other accounts of expressive law, the attitudinal theory
suggests that economic theorists should stop implicitly assuming
that law matters only because legal sanctions affect the costs of
behavior. The economic analysis of a legal rule is at least presumptively incomplete when it ignores the possibility that law influences behavior expressively, as by influencing beliefs about
approval patterns. In addition to this point, the attitudinal theory of expressive law has a number of interesting implications
including: that local law will have a greater expressive effect than
state or national law; that the expressive effect depends on the
126 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
127 Stating the causal claim explicitly also helps to reveal the limitations of the
reasoning. Individuals sometimes assert that an action "sends a message" of division
without giving any plausible account of how the action could have an expressive
effect. In J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-42 (1994), for example, the majority
states that the use of peremptory challenges on the basis of gender sends a "message" "ratify[ing] and reinforc[ing]" gender stereotypes. But it is not clear whether
the public is aware of peremptory challenges, knows when a lawyer exercises the
challenge on the basis of gender, or infers from a state lawyer's gender-based challenges that some stereotype is true. This does not mean J.E.B. was wrongly decided,
but that the symbolic rationale was weak. Contrast the much stronger publicity for a
sexist "message" where the state legislature funds schools that train only one sex for
a profession already associated with that sex. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996) (invalidating state support of all-male military academy); Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (invalidating state support of allfemale nursing school).
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degree to which the public believes that law is positively correlated with public opinion; that courts can have an expressive effect because court decisions are so correlated; that ideological
interest groups will seek to capture the expressive power of law
as a means of expanding their influence over the behavior of
others; and that some limits on government expression may be
desirable to avoid its undesirable exploitation by such groups.
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